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Knowledge and Security
Riccardo Pucella∗
Abstract
Epistemic concepts, and in some cases epistemic logic, have been used in security
research to formalize security properties of systems. This survey illustrates some of
these uses by focusing on confidentiality in the context of cryptographic protocols,
and in the context of multi-level security systems.
Security: the state of being free from danger or threat.
(New Oxford American Dictionary)
1 Introduction
A persistent intuition in some quarters of the security research community says that epis-
temic logic and, more generally, epistemic concepts are useful for reasoning about the
security of systems. What grounds this intuition is that much work in the field is based
on epistemic concepts—sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly, by and large rein-
venting possible-worlds semantics for knowledge and belief.1
Reasoning about the security of systems in practice amounts to establishing that those
systems satisfy various security properties. A security property, roughly speaking, is a
property of a system stating that the system is not vulnerable to a particular threat. Threats,
in this context, are generally taken to be attacks by agents intent on subverting the system.
While what might be considered a threat—and therefore what security properties are
meant to protect against—is in the eye of the beholder, several properties have historically
been treated as security properties:
• Data Confidentiality: only authorized agents should have access to a piece of data;
more generally, only authorized agents should be able to infer any information about
a piece of data.
• Data Integrity: only authorized agents should have access to alter a piece of data.
∗Author’s email: riccardo@acm.org. To appear in Handbook of Logics for Knowledge and Belief.
1This chapter assumes from the reader a basic knowledge of epistemic logic and its Hintikka-style possible-
worlds semantics; see §6 for references. Furthermore, to simplify the exposition, the term epistemic is used to
refer both to knowledge and to belief throughout.
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• Agent Authentication: an agent should be able to prove her identity to another
agent.
• Data Authentication: an agent should be able to determine the source of a piece of
data.
• Anonymity: the identity of an agent or the source of a piece of data should be kept
hidden except from authorized agents.
• Message Non-repudiation: the sender of a message should not be able to deny hav-
ing sent the message.
These properties may seem intuitive on a first reading but they are vague and depend on
terms that require clarification: secret, authorized, access to a piece of data, source, identity.
Epistemic concepts come into play when defining many of the terms that appear in the
statements of security properties. Indeed, those terms can often be usefully understood in
terms of knowledge: confidentiality can be read as no agent except for authorized agents can
know a piece of information; authentication as an agent knows the identity of the agent with whom
she is interacting, or an agent knows the identity of the agent who sent the information; anonymity
as no one knows the identity of the agent who performed a particular action; and so on. While it
is not the case that every security property can be read as an epistemic property, enough
of them can to justify studying them as epistemic properties.
Epistemic logic and epistemic concepts play two roles in security research:
• Definitional: they are used to formalize security properties and concepts, and pro-
vide a clear semantic grounding for them. Epistemic logic may be explicitly used as
an explanatory and definitional language for properties of interest.
• Practical: they are used to derive verification and enforcement techniques for secu-
rity properties, that is, to either establish that a security property is true in a system,
or to force a security property to be true in a system.
It is fair to say that after nearly three decades of research, epistemic logic has had sev-
eral successes on the definitional front and somewhat fewer on the practical front. This is
perhaps not surprising. While epistemic logic and epistemic concepts are well suited for
definitions and for describing semantic models, verification of epistemic properties tends
to be expensive, and tools for the verification of security properties in practice often ap-
proximate epistemic properties using properties that are easier to check, such as safety
properties.2
This chapter illustrates the use of epistemic logic and epistemic concepts for reasoning
about security through the study of a specific security property, confidentiality. Not only is
confidentiality a prime example of the use of knowledge to make a security property pre-
cise, but it has also been studied extensively from several perspectives. Moreover, many
2A safety property is a property of the form a bad state is never reached in any execution of the system, for some
definition of bad state. A safety property can be checked by examining every possible execution independently
of any other; in contrast, checking an epistemic property requires examining every possible execution in the
context of all other possible executions.
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of the issues arising while studying confidentiality also arise for other security properties
with an epistemic flavor.
Confidentiality is explored in two contexts: cryptographic protocols in §2, and multi-
level security systems in §3. Cryptographic protocols are communication protocols that
use cryptography to protect information exchanged between agents in a system. While
it may seem simple enough for Alice to send a confidential message to Betty by encrypt-
ing it, Alice and Betty need to share a common key for this to work. How is such a key
distributed before communication may take place? Most cryptographic protocols involve
key creation and distribution, and these are notoriously difficult to get right. Key distri-
bution also forces the consideration of authentication as an additional security property.
Cryptographic protocol analysis is the one field of security research that has explicitly and
extensively used epistemic logic, and the bulk of this chapter is dedicated to that topic.
In multi-level security systems, one is generally interested in confidentiality guaran-
tees even when information is used or released within the system during a computation.
The standard example is that of a centralized system where agents have different secu-
rity clearances and interact with data with different security classifications; the desired
confidentiality guarantees ensure that classified data, no matter how it is manipulated by
agents with an appropriate security clearance, never flows to an agent that does not have
an appropriate security clearance. Most of the work in this field of security research uses
epistemic concepts implicitly— the models use possible-worlds definitions of knowledge,
but no epistemic logic is introduced. All reasoning is semantic reasoning in the models.
Security properties other than confidentiality are briefly discussed in §4. The chapter
concludes in §5 with some personal views on the use of epistemic logic and epistemic con-
cepts in security research. My observations should not be particularly controversial, but
my main conclusion remains that progress beyond the current state of the art in security
research—at least in security research that benefits from epistemic logic—will require a
deeper understanding of resource-bounded knowledge, which is itself an active research
area in epistemic logic.
All bibliographic references are postponed to §6, where full references and additional
details are given for topics covered in the main body of the chapter. It is worth noting
that the literature on reasoning about security draws from several fields besides logic. For
instance, much of the research on cryptographic protocols derives from earlier work in
distributed computing. Similarly, recent research both on cryptographic protocol analysis
and on confidentiality in multi-level systems is based on work in programming language
semantics and static analysis. The interested reader is invited to follow the references given
in §6 for details.
2 Cryptographic Protocols
Cryptographic protocols are communication protocols—rules for exchangingmessages be-
tween agents—that use cryptography to achieve a security goal such as authenticating one
agent to another, or exchanging confidential messages.
Cryptographic protocols are a popular object of study for several reasons. First, they
are concrete—they correspond to actual artifacts implemented and used in practice. Sec-
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ond, their theory extends that of distributed protocols and network protocols in general,
which are themselves thoroughly studied.
Cryptographic protocols have characteristics that distinguish them from more general
communication protocols. In particular, they
(1) enforce security properties;
(2) rely on cryptography;
(3) execute in the presence of attackers that might attempt to subvert them.
Protocols can be analyzed concretely or symbolically. The concrete perspective views
protocols as exchanging messages consisting of sequences of bits and subject to formatting
requirements, which is the perspective used in most network protocols research. The sym-
bolic perspective views protocols as exchanging messages consisting of symbols in some
formal language, which is the perspective used in most distributed protocols research. The
focus of this section is on symbolic cryptographic protocols analysis.
2.1 Protocols
A common notation for protocols is to list the sequence of messages exchanged between
the parties involved in the protocol, since the kinds of protocols studied rarely involve
complex control flow.
A simple protocol between Alice and Betty (represented by A and B) in which Alice
sends messagem1 to Betty and Betty responds by sending message m2 to Alice would be
described by:
1. A −→ B : m1
2. B −→ A : m2
(1)
The message sequence notation takes a global view of the protocol, describing the protocol
from the outside, so to speak. An alternate way to describe a protocol is to specify the roles
of the parties involved in the protocol. For protocol (1), for instance, there are two roles:
the initiator role, who sends messagem1 to the receiver and waits for a response message,
and the receiver role, who waits for a message to arrive from the initiator and responds
withm2.
A protocol executes in an environment, which details anything relevant to the exe-
cution of said protocol, such as the agents participating in the protocol, whether other
instances of the protocol are also executed concurrently, the possible attackers and their
capabilities. The result of executing a protocol in a given environment can be modeled by
a set of traces, where a trace corresponds to a possible execution of the protocol. A trace is
a sequence of global states. A global state records the local state of every agent involved in
the protocol, as well as the state of the environment. This general description is compati-
ble with most representations in the literature, and can be viewed as a Kripke structure by
defining a suitable accessibility relation over the states of the system.
To illustrate protocols in general, and initiate the study of confidentiality, here are two
simple protocols that achieve a specific form of confidentiality without requiring cryptog-
raphy. One lesson to be drawn from these examples is that confidentiality in some cases
can be achieved without complex operations.
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The first protocol solves an instance of the following problem: how two agents may
exchange secret information in the open, without an eavesdropping third agent learning
about the information. The instance of the problem, called the Russian Cards problem,
is pleasantly concrete and can be explained to children: Alice and Betty each draw three
cards from a pack of seven cards, and Eve (the eavesdropper) gets the remaining card. Can
players Alice and Betty learn each other’s cards without revealing that information to Eve?
The restriction is that Alice and Betty can only make public announcements that Eve can
hear.
Several protocols for solving the Russian Cards problem have been proposed; a fairly
simple solution is the Seven Hands protocol. Recall that there are seven cards: three are dealt
to Alice, three are dealt to Betty, and the last card is dealt to Eve. Call the cards dealt to
Alice a1, a2, a3, and the cards dealt to Betty b1, b2, b3. The card dealt to Eve is e.
The Seven Hands protocol is a two-step protocol that Alice can use to tell her cards to
Betty and learn Betty’s cards in response:
1. A −→ B : SHA
2. B −→ A : SHB
(2)
where SHA and SHB are the following specific messages:
(1) Message SHA is constructed by Alice as follows. Alice first chooses a random re-
naming W,X, Y,Z of the elements in {b1, b2, b3, e}, that is, a random permutation of
the four cards not in her hand. Message SHA then consists of the following seven
subsets of cards, in some arbitrary order:
{a1, a2, a3}
{a1,W,X} {a1, Y, Z}
{a2,W, Y } {a2,X,Z}
{a3,W,Z} {a3,X, Y }
These subsets are carefully chosen: for every possible hand of Betty, that is, for every
possible subset S of size three of {W,X, Y,Z}, there is exactly one set in SHA with
which S has an empty intersection, and that set is Alice’s hand {a1, a2, a3}. Thus,
upon receiving SHA, Betty can identify Alice’s hand by examining the sets Alice sent
and picking the one with which her own hand has an empty intersection, and in the
process Betty learns Alice’s hand, and by elimination, Eve’s card.
(2) Message SHB , Betty’s response, is simply Eve’s card. Alice, upon receiving SHB,
knows her own hand and Eve’s card, and therefore can infer by elimination Betty’s
hand.
At the end of the exchange, Alice knows Betty’s hand and Betty knows Alice’s hand, as
required.
What about Eve? She does not learn anything about the cards in Alice or Betty’s hand.
Indeed, after seeing Alice’s message, Eve has no information about Alice’s hand, since
every card appears in exactly three of the sets Alice sent. There is no way for Eve to isolate
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which of those cards might be one of Alice’s. Furthermore, after seeing Betty’s message,
all she has learned is her own card, which she already knew.
If we define c∈ i to be the primitive proposition card c is in player i’s hand (whereA,B,E
represent Alice, Betty, and Eve, respectively) then we expect that the following epistemic
formula holds after the first message is received by Betty:
KB(a1 ∈A) ∧KB(a2 ∈A) ∧KB(a3 ∈A),
that the following epistemic formula holds after the second message is received by Alice:
KA(b1 ∈B) ∧KA(b2 ∈B) ∧KB(b3 ∈B),
and that the following formula holds after either of the messages is received:
¬KE(a1 ∈A) ∧ ¬KE(a2 ∈A) ∧ ¬KE(a3 ∈A)
∧ ¬KE(b1 ∈B) ∧ ¬KE(b2 ∈B) ∧ ¬KE(b3 ∈B).
It is an easy exercise to construct the Kripke structures describing this scenario.
The Seven Hands protocol is ideally suited for epistemic reasoning via a possible-
worlds semantics for knowledge, as it relies on combinatorial analysis. Its applicability,
however, is limited.
The second protocol is a protocol to ensure anonymity, which is a form of confiden-
tiality (see §4). It does not rely on combinatorial analysis but rather on properties of the
XOR operation.3 The Dining Cryptographers protocol was originally developed to solve
the following problem. Suppose that Alice, Betty, and Charlene are three cryptographers
having dinner at their favorite restaurant. Their waiter informs them that arrangements
have beenmade for the bill to be paid anonymously by one party. That payer might be one
of the cryptographers, but it might also be U.S. National Security Agency. The three cryp-
tographers respect each other’s right to make an anonymous payment, but they would like
to know whether the NSA is paying.
The following protocol can be used to satisfy the cryptographers’ curiosity and allow
each of them to determine whether the NSA or one of her colleagues is paying, without
revealing the identity of the payer in the latter case.
(1) Every cryptographer i flips a fair coin privately with her neighbor j on her right: the
Boolean result T{i,j} is true if the coin lands tails, and false if the coin lands heads.
Thus, the cryptographers produce the Boolean results T{A,B}, T{A,C}, T{B,C}; Alice
sees T{A,B} and T{A,C}; Betty seesT{A,B} and T{B,C}; Charlene sees T{A,C} and T{B,C}.
(2) Every cryptographer i computes a private Boolean value Df i as true if the two coin
tosses she has witnessed are different, and false if they are the same. Thus, Df A =
T{A,B} ⊕ T{A,C}, Df B = T{A,B} ⊕ T{B,C}, and Df C = T{A,C} ⊕ T{B,C}.
(3) Every cryptographer i publicly announces Df i, except for the paying cryptographer
(if there is one) who announces ¬Df i, the negation of Df i.
3XOR (exclusive or) is a binary Boolean operation ⊕ defined by taking b1 ⊕ b2 to be true if and only if
exactly one of b1 or b2 is true. It is associative and commutative.
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Once the protocol is executed, any curious cryptographer interested in determining who
paid for dinner simply has to take the XOR of all the announcements: if the result is false ,
then the NSA paid, and if the result is true , then one of the cryptographers paid.
To see why this is the case, consider the two possible scenarios. Suppose the NSA paid.
Then the XOR of all the announcements is:
Df A ⊕Df B ⊕Df C
=
(
T{A,B} ⊕ T{A,C}
)
⊕
(
T{B,C} ⊕ T{A,B}
)
⊕
(
T{A,C} ⊕ T{B,C}
)
=
(
T{A,B} ⊕ T{A,B}
)
⊕
(
T{B,C} ⊕ T{B,C}
)
⊕
(
T{A,C} ⊕ T{A,C}
)
= false ⊕ false ⊕ false
= false
whereas if one of the cryptographers paid (without loss of generality, suppose it is Alice),
then the XOR of all the announcements is:
¬Df A ⊕Df B ⊕Df C
= ¬
(
T{A,B} ⊕ T{A,C}
)
⊕
(
T{B,C} ⊕ T{A,B}
)
⊕
(
T{A,C} ⊕ T{B,C}
)
=
(
¬T{A,B} ⊕ T{A,C}
)
⊕
(
T{B,C} ⊕ T{A,B}
)
⊕
(
T{A,C} ⊕ T{B,C}
)
=
(
¬T{A,B} ⊕ T{A,B}
)
⊕
(
T{B,C} ⊕ T{B,C}
)
⊕
(
T{A,C} ⊕ T{A,C}
)
= true ⊕ false ⊕ false
= true
If one of the cryptographers paid, neither of the two other cryptographerswill knowwhich
of her colleagues paid, since either possibility is compatible with what they can observe.
Again, it is an easy exercise to construct the Kripke structures capturing these scenarios.
2.2 Cryptography
While protocols such as the Seven Hands protocol and the Dining Cryptographers pro-
tocol enforce confidentiality by carefully constructing specific messages meant to convey
specific information in a specific context, most cryptographic protocols rely on cryptogra-
phy for confidentiality.
Cryptography seems a natural approach for confidentiality. After all, the whole point
of cryptography is to hide information in such a way that only agents with a suitable key
can access the information. And indeed, if the goal is for Alice to send messagem to Betty
whenAlice and Betty alone share a key to encrypt and decryptmessages, then the simplest
protocol for confidential message exchange is simply for Alice to encryptm and send it to
Betty. But how do Alice and Betty come to share a key in the first place? Distributing keys
is tricky, because keys have to be sent to the right agents, in such a way that no other agent
can get them.
Before addressing those problems, let us review the basics of cryptography. The reader
is assumed to have been exposed to at least informal descriptions of cryptography. An
encryption scheme is defined by a set of sourcetexts, a set of ciphertexts, a set of keys, and
for every key k an injective encryption function ek producing a ciphertext from a sourcetext
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and a decryption function dk producing a sourcetext from a ciphertext, with the property
that dk(ek(x)) = x for all sourcetexts x. We often assume that ciphertexts and keys are
included in sourcetexts to allow for nested encryption and encrypted keys.4
There are two broad classes of encryption schemes, which differ in how keys are used
for decryption. Shared-key encryption schemes require an agent to have a full key to both
encrypt and decrypt a message. They tend to be efficient, and can often be implemented
directly in hardware. Public-key encryption schemes, on the other hand, are set up so that an
agent only needs to know part of a key (called the public key) to encrypt a message, while
needing the full key to decrypt a message. The full key cannot be easily recovered from
knowing only the public key. Public keys are generally made public (hence the name),
so that any agent can encrypt a message intended for, say, Alice, by looking up and using
Alice’s public key. Since only Alice has the full key, only she can decrypt that message. DES
and AES are concrete examples of shared-key encryption schemes, while RSA and elliptic-
curve encryption schemes are concrete examples of public-key encryption schemes.
Cryptographic protocols are neededwith shared-key encryption schemes because agents
need to share a key in order to exchange encrypted messages. How is such a shared key
distributed? And how can agents make sure they are not tricked into sharing those keys
with attackers? An additional difficulty is that when the same shared key is reused for ev-
ery interaction between two agents, the content of all those interactions becomes available
to an attacker that manages to learn that key. Tominimize the impact of a key compromise,
many systems create a fresh session key for any two agents that want to communicate,
which exacerbates the key distribution problem.
Public-key encryption simplifies key distribution, since public keys can simply be pub-
lished. Any agent wanting to send a confidential message to Alice has only to look up Al-
ice’s public key and use it to encrypt her message. The problem, from Alice’s perspective,
is that anyone can encrypt a message and send it to her, which means that if Alice wants to
make sure that the encrypted message she received came from Betty, some sort of authen-
tication mechanism is needed. Furthermore, all known public-key encryption schemes
are computationally expensive, so a common approach is to have agents that want to ex-
change messages in a session first use public-key encryption to generate a session key for a
shared-key encryption scheme that they use for their exchangedmessages. Such a scenario
requires authentication to ensure that agents are not tricked into communicating with an
attacker.
Sample Cryptographic Protocols. Most classical cryptographic protocols are designed to
solve the problem of key distribution for shared-key encryption schemes, and of authenti-
cation for public-key encryption schemes. In these contexts, confidentiality and authenti-
cation are the key properties: confidentiality to enforce that distributed keys remain secret
from attackers, and authentication to ensure that agents can establish the identity of the
other agents involved in a message exchange.
This section presents two protocols, each illustrating different problems that can arise
and highlighting vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. (Attackers will be introduced
more carefully in the next section.) The first protocol distributes session keys for a shared-
4This section considers deterministic encryption schemes only, ignoring probabilistic encryption schemes.
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key encryption scheme, while the second protocol aims at achieving mutual authentication
for public-key encryption schemes. Not all of the problems illustrated will occur in every
protocol, of course, nor are vulnerabilities in one context necessarily vulnerabilities in an-
other context.
For the first protocol, consider the following situation. Suppose Alice wants to commu-
nicate with Betty, and there is a trusted server Serena who will generate a shared session
key (for some shared-key encryption scheme) for them to use. Assume that every regis-
tered user of the system shares a distinct key with the trusted server in some shared-key
encryption scheme; these keys for Alice and Betty are denoted kAS and kBS .
The idea is for Serena to generate a fresh key and send it to both Alice and Betty. Send-
ing it in the clear, however, would allow an eavesdropping attacker to read it and then
use it to decrypt messages between Alice and Betty. Since Alice and Betty both share a
key with Serena, one solution might be to use those keys to encrypt the session key sent
to Alice and Betty, but this turns out to be difficult to implement in practice. Here is the
problem. Alice, wanting to communicate with Betty, sends a message to Serena asking
her to generate a session key, and Serena sends it to both Alice and Betty. As far as Betty is
concerned, she receives a keywith an indication that Alice will use it to send hermessages.
Betty now has to store the key and wait for Alice to send her messages encryptedwith that
key. If Alice wants to set up several concurrent communications with Betty, then Betty will
have to match each incoming communication with the appropriate key, which is annoying
at best and inefficient at worst. It turns out to be more efficient for Serena to send the fresh
session key ksess to Alice, and for Alice to forward the key to Betty in her first message.
This observation leads to the following protocol:
1. A −→ S : B
2. S −→ A : B, {ksess}kAS , {ksess}kBS
3. A −→ B : A, {ksess}kBS
(3)
Both Alice and Betty learn key ksess , which is kept secret from eavesdroppers.
While this protocol might seem sufficient to distribute a key to both Alice and Betty,
several things can go wrong in the presence of an insider attacker, that is, an attacker that
is also a registered user of the system and has control over the network (i.e., can intercept
and forge messages; see §2.3).
The insider attacker, Isabel, can initiate a communication with trusted server Serena via
her shared key kIS (Isabel is assumed to have such a key because she is a registered user
of the system), and use the key to pose as Alice to Betty. Here is a sequence of messages
exemplifying the attack, where the notation I[A] denotes I posing as A:5
I −→ S : B
S −→ I : B, {ksess}kIS , {ksess}kBS
I[A] −→ B : A, {ksess}kBS
(4)
Betty believes that she is sharing key ksess with Alice, while she is in fact sharing it with
5We can assume that every message has a from and to field—think email—and that these can be forged.
Isabel posing as Alice means that Isabel sends a message and forges the from field of the message to hold
Alice’s name.
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Isabel. This is a failure of authentication—the protocol does not authenticate the initiator
to the responder.
Isabel can also trick Alice into believing she is talking to Betty, by posing as the server
and interceptingmessages betweenAlice and the server, as the following sequence of mes-
sages exemplifies:
A −→ I[S] : B
I[A] −→ S : I
S −→ I[A] : I, {ksess}kAS , {ksess}kIS
I[S] −→ A : B, {ksess}kAS , {ksess}kIS
A −→ I[B] : A, {ksess}kIS
(5)
This form of attack is commonly known as a man-in-the-middle attack. Isabel intercepts
Alice’s message to the server, and turns around and sends a different message to the server
posing as Alice. The response from the server is intercepted by Isabel, who crafts a suitable
response back to Alice. Alice takes that response (which she believes is coming from the
server) and sends it to Betty, but that message is intercepted by Isabel as well. Now, as
far as Alice is concerned, she has successfully completed the protocol, and holds a key kIS
that she believes she can use to communicate confidentially with Betty, while she is really
communicating with Isabel.
How can we correct these vulnerabilities? One feature on which these attacks rely is
that the identity of the intended parties for the keys in the protocol are easily forged by
the attacker. So one fix is to bind the intended parties to the appropriate copies of the key.
Here is an amended version of the protocol:
1. A −→ S : B
2. S −→ A : B, {B, ksess}kAS , {A, ksess}kBS
3. A −→ B : {A, ksess}kBS
(6)
When Alice receives her response from the server and decrypts her message {B, ksess}kAS ,
she can verify that the key she meant Serena to create to communicate with Betty is in fact
a key meant to communicate with Betty. This suffices to foil Isabel in attack (5). Similarly,
when Betty receives her message from Alice containing {A, ksess}kBS , she can verify that
the key is meant to communicate with Alice. This suffices to foil attack (4).
Protocol (6) now seems to work as intended. It does suffer from another potential vul-
nerability, though, one that is less directly threatening, but can still cause problems: it is
susceptible to a replay attack. Here is the scenario. Suppose that Isabel eavesdrops on
messages as Alice gets a session key k0 from the trusted server to communicate with Betty,
and holds on to messages {B, k0}kAS and {A, k0}kBS . Suppose further that after a long de-
lay Isabel manages to somehow obtain key k0, perhaps by breaking into Alice’s or Betty’s
computer, or by expending several months’ worth of effort to crack the encryption. Once
Isabel has k0, she can subvert an attempt by Alice to get a session key for communicating
with Betty by simply intercepting the messages from Alice to Serena, and replaying the
messages {B, k0}kAS and {A, k0}kBS she intercepted in the past. The following sequence of
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messages exemplifies this attack:
A −→ I[S] : B
I[S] −→ A : B, {B, k0}kAS , {A, k0}kBS
A −→ B : {A, k0}kBS
(7)
The main point here is that Alice and Betty after this protocol interaction end up using
key k0 as their session key, but that key is one that Isabel knows, meaning that Isabel can
decrypt every singlemessage that Alice and Betty exchange in that session. So even though
she does not have the shared keys kAS and kBS , she has managed to trick Alice and Betty
into using a key she knows.
Preventing this kind of replay attack requires ensuring that messages from earlier ex-
ecutions of the protocol cannot be used in later executions. One way to do that is to have
every agent record every message they have ever sent and received, but that is too expen-
sive to be practical. The common alternative is to use timestamps, or nonces. A nonce is
a large random number, meant to be unpredictable and essentially unique—the likelihood
that the same nonce occurs twice within two different sessions should be negligible. To fix
protocol (6) and prevent replay attacks, it suffices for Alice and Betty to generate nonces
nA and nB, respectively, and send them to trusted server Serena so that she can include
them in her responses:
1. A −→ B : nA
2. B −→ S : A,nA, nB
3. S −→ A : {B, ksess , nA}kAS , {A, ksess , nB}kBS
4. A −→ B : {A, ksess , nB}kBS
(8)
As long as Alice and Betty, when each receives her encrypted message containing the ses-
sion key, both check that the nonce in the encryptedmessage is the one that they generated,
then they can be confident that the encrypted messages have not been reused from earlier
sessions.
Protocol (8) now seems to work as intended and is not vulnerable to replay attacks. But
it does not actually guarantee mutual authentication; that is, it does not guarantee to Alice
that she is in fact talking to Betty when she believes she is, and to Betty that she is in fact
talking to Alice when she believes she is. Consider the following attack, in which attacker
Trudy is not an insider—she is not a registered user of the system—but has control of the
network and thus can intercept and forge messages. Trudy poses as Betty by intercepting
messages from Alice and forging responses:
A −→ T [B] : nA
T [B] −→ S : A,nA, nT
S −→ A : {B, ksess , nA}kAS , {A, ksess , nT }kBS
A −→ T [B] : {A, ksess , nT }kBS
(9)
From Alice’s perspective, she has completed the protocol by exchanging messages with
Betty, and holds a session key for sending confidential messages to Betty. But of course
Alice has been communicating with Trudy, and Betty is not even aware of the exchange.
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Trudy cannot actually read the messages sent by Alice, so there is no breach of confiden-
tiality, but Trudy has managed to trick Alice into believing she shares a session key with
Betty. In terms of knowledge, Alice knows the session key, but she does not know that
Betty does.
There is also a way for Trudy to trick Betty into believing she shares a session key with
Alice, by posing as Alice:
T [A] −→ B : nT
B −→ S : A,nT , nB
S −→ T [A] : {B, ksess , nT }kAS , {A, ksess , nB}kBS
T [A] −→ B : {A, ksess , nB}kBS
(10)
From Betty’s perspective, she has completed the protocol by exchanging messages with
Alice, and holds a session key for sending confidential messages to Alice. But of course
Betty has been communicating with Trudy, and Alice is not even aware of the exchange. In
terms of knowledge, Betty knows the session key, but she does not know that Alice does.
Mutual authentication is achieved through an additional nonce exchange at the end of
the protocol which uses the newly created session key:
1. A −→ B : nA
2. B −→ S : A,nA, nB , n
′
B
3. S −→ A : n′B, {B, ksess , nA}kAS , {A, ksess , nB}kBS
4. A −→ B : n′A, {A, ksess , nB}kBS , {A,n
′
B}ksess
5. B −→ A : {B,n′A}ksess
(11)
This protocol now seems to work as intended without being vulnerable to replay at-
tacks or authentication failures. How can this be guaranteed?
Intuitively, protocol (11) is not susceptible to replay attacks because of the use of nonces:
Alice can deduce that the first encrypted component of the third message was not reused
from an earlier protocol execution, and Betty can deduce that the first encrypted compo-
nent of the fourth message was not reused from an earlier protocol execution.
Similarly, mutual authentication in protocol (11) follows from the use of shared keys:
Alice can deduce that Serena created the first encrypted component of the third message;
and Betty can deduce that Serena created the first encrypted component of the fourth mes-
sage. Moreover, if Betty believes that ksess is a key known only to Alice and herself, then
she can deduce that Alice created the second encrypted component in the fourth message,
and similarly, if Alice believes that ksess is a key known only to Betty and herself, then she
can deduce that Betty created the encrypted component in the fifth message.
The confidentiality of the session key requires the assumption that trusted server Ser-
ena is indeed trustworthy and creates keys that have not previously been used and dis-
tributed to other parties. If so, then Alice can deduce that the session key she receives in
the third message is a confidential key for communicating with Betty, since Alice can also
deduce that she has been executing the protocol with Betty. Similarly, Betty can deduce
that the session key she receives in the fourth message is a confidential key for commu-
nicating with Alice, since Betty can deduce that she has been executing the protocol with
Alice
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In a precise sense, the goal of cryptographic protocol analysis is to prove these kind of
properties formally, and many techniques have been developedwhich are surveyed below
in §2.5.
The second cryptographic protocol uses a public-key encryption scheme to achieve
mutual authentication:
1. A −→ B : {A,nA}pkB
2. B −→ A : {nA, nB}pkA
3. A −→ B : {nB}pkB
(12)
where pkA and pkB are the public keys of Alice and Betty, respectively, and nA and nB are
nonces.
Intuitively, when Alice receives her nonce nA back in the second message, she knows
that Bettymust have decrypted her first message at some point during the execution of the
protocol (because only Betty could have decrypted themessage that contained it), and sim-
ilarly, when Betty receives her nonce nB back, she knows that Alice must have decrypted
her second message. Note that nA and nB are kept confidential throughout the protocol,
and that mutual authentication relies on that confidentiality.
Protocol (12), known as the Needham-Schroeder protocol, achieves mutual authentica-
tion even in the presence of an attacker that has control of the network and can intercept
and forge messages. It is however vulnerable to insider attackers that are registered users
of the system and have control of the network. For example, insider attacker Isabel can
use an attempt by Alice to initiate an authentication session with her to trick unsuspecting
Betty into believing that Alice is initiating an authentication session with her:
A −→ I : {A,nA}pk I
I[A] −→ B : {A,nA}pkB
B −→ I[A] : {nA, nB}pkA
I −→ A : {nA, nB}pkA
A −→ I : {nB}pk I
I[A] −→ B : {nB}pkB
(13)
From Alice’s perspective, she has managed to complete a mutual authentication session
with Isabel, which was her goal all along. But Isabel also managed to complete an authen-
tication session with Betty, tricking Betty into believing she is interacting with Alice.
There is a simple fix that eliminates that vulnerability:
1. A −→ B : {A,nA}pkB
2. B −→ A : {B,nA, nB}pkA
3. A −→ B : {nB}pkB
(14)
It is interesting to see how the fixworks: if Alice, during hermutual authentication attempt
with Isabel, notices that the response message she receives from Isabel names a different
agent than Isabel, then she can deduce that her authentication attempt is being subverted
to try to confound another agent, and she can abort the authentication attempt at that
point.
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2.3 Attackers
A distinguishing feature of cryptographic protocols, besides the use of cryptography, is
that they are deployed in potentially hostile environments in which attackers may attempt
to subvert the operations of the protocol.
Reasoning about cryptographic protocols, therefore, requires a threat model, describ-
ing the kind of attackers against which the cryptographic protocol should protect. Attack-
ers commonly considered in the literature include:
• Eavesdropping attackers: assumed to be able to read all messages exchanged be-
tween agents. Eavesdropping attackers do not affect communication in any way,
however, and remain hidden from other agents.
• Active attackers: assumed to have complete control over communications between
agents, that is, able to read all messages as well as intercept them and forge newmes-
sages. They remain hidden from other agents, and thus no agent will intentionally
attempt to communicate with an active attacker.
• Insider attackers: assumed to have complete control over communications between
agents just like active attackers, but also considered legitimate registered users in
their own right. They can therefore initiate interactions with other agents as them-
selves, and other agents can intentionally initiate interactions with them.6
The class of insider attackers includes the class of active attackers, which itself includes
the class of eavesdropping attackers. Thus, in that sense, an insider attacker is stronger
than an active attacker which is stronger than an eavesdropping attacker. In practice, this
means that a cryptographic protocol that is deemed secure in the presence of an insider
attacker will remain so in the presence of active and eavesdropping attackers, and so on.
We saw several examples of attacks in §2.2, performed by different kind of attackers.
Most of the protocols in §2.2 achieve their goals in the presence of eavesdropping attack-
ers, while some also achieve their goals in the presence of active attackers but fail in the
presence of insider attackers. The Needham-Schroeder protocol (12), for instance, can
be shown to satisfy mutual authentication in the presence of active attackers, but not in
the presence of insider attackers—as exemplified by attack (13)—while the variant proto-
col (14) achieves mutual authentication even in the presence of insider attackers.
The attacks described in §2.2 took place at the level of the protocols themselves, and
not at the level of the encryption schemes used by the protocols. But vulnerabilities in
encryption schemes are also relevant: an attacker cracking an encrypted message from the
trusted server to the agents in protocol (11) will learn the session key, which will invali-
date any confidentiality guarantees claimed for the protocol. Despite this, cryptographic
protocol are typically analyzed independently from the details of the encryption scheme.
The main reason is that it abstracts away from vulnerabilities specific to the encryption
scheme used, leaving only those relating to the cryptographic protocol. Vulnerabilities in
encryption schemes are usually independent of the cryptographic protocols that use them,
6A fourth class of attackers, less commonly considered, shares characteristics with both eavesdropping
attackers and insider attackers: dishonest agents are assumed not to have control over the network but may
attempt to subvert the protocol while acting within the limits imposed on legitimate users.
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and can be investigated separately. A vulnerability in the protocol will be a vulnerability
no matter what encryption scheme is used, and requires a change in the protocol to correct
the flaw.
The standard way to analyze cryptographic protocols independently of any encryption
scheme is to use a formal model of cryptography that assumes perfect encryption leaking no
information about encrypted content. It can be defined as the following symbolic encryp-
tion scheme. If P is a set of plaintexts and K is a set of keys, then the set of sourcetexts is
taken to be the smallest set S of symbolic terms containing P and K such that (x, y) ∈ S
and {x}k ∈ S when x, y ∈ S and k ∈ K . Intuitively, (x, y) represents the concatenation
of x and y, and {x}k represents the encryption of x with key k. The ciphertexts are all
sourcetexts of the form {x}k . The symbolic encryption function ek(x) simply returns {x}k,
and the symbolic decryption function dk(x) returns y if x is {y}k, and some special token
fail otherwise.7
In the context of analyzing protocols with a formal model of cryptography, attack-
ers are usually modeled using Dolev-Yao capabilities. These capabilities go hand in hand
with the symbolic aspect of formal models of cryptography. Intuitively, eavesdropping
Dolev-Yao attackers can split up concatenated messages and decrypt them if they know
the decryption key; active Dolev-Yao attackers can additionally create new messages by
concatenating existing messages and encrypting them with known keys. Dolev-Yao at-
tackers do not have the capability of cracking encryptions, nor can they access messages
at the level of their component bits.
2.4 Modeling Knowledge
The analyses in §2.2 show that various notions of knowledge arise rather naturally when
reasoning informally about properties of cryptographic protocols. There are essentially
two main kinds of knowledge described in the literature. In some frameworks, both kinds
of knowledge are used.
Message Knowledge. The first kind of knowledge, the most common and in some sense
the most straightforward, tries to capture the notion of knowing a message.
There are several equivalent approaches to modeling this kind of knowledge, at least
in a formal model of cryptography with Dolev-Yao capabilities. Intuitively, the idea is
a constructive one: an attacker knows a message if she can construct that message from
other messages she has received or intercepted. (Message knowledge in the context of
confidentiality properties is often presented from the perspective of an attacker, since con-
fidentiality is breached when the attacker comes to know a particular message.) In such a
context, knowing a message is sometimes called having a message, possessing a message, or
seeing a message.
Message knowledgemay be described via the following sets. LetH be a set ofmessages
that the attacker has received or intercepted. The set Parts(H), the set of all components
7The symbolic decryption function embodies an assumption that encrypted messages have enough redun-
dancy for an agent to determine when decryption is successful.
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of messages from H , is defined inductively by the following inference rules:
m ∈ H
m ∈ Parts(H)
{m}k ∈ Parts(H)
m ∈ Parts(H)
(m1,m2) ∈ Parts(H)
m1 ∈ Parts(H)
(m1,m2) ∈ Parts(H)
m2 ∈ Parts(H)
We see that the content of all encrypted messages inH is included in Parts(H), even those
that the attacker cannot decrypt. In a sense, Parts(H) is an upper bound on messages
the attacker can know. In contrast, the set Analyzed(H) of messages that the attacker can
actually see is more restricted:
m ∈ H
m ∈ Analyzed(H)
(m1,m2) ∈ Analyzed(H)
m1 ∈ Analyzed(H)
(m1,m2) ∈ Analyzed(H)
m2 ∈ Analyzed(H)
{m}k ∈ Analyzed(H) k ∈ Analyzed(H)
m ∈ Analyzed(H)
Clearly, Analyzed(H) ⊆ Parts(H). One definition of message knowledge is to say that
an attacker knows message m in a state where she has received or intercepted a set H of
messages if m ∈ Analyzed(H). This is the attacker knows what she can see interpretation of
message knowledge.
The best way to understand this concept of knowledge is to use a physical analogy:
we can think of plaintext messages as stones, and encrypted messages as locked boxes.
Encrypting a message means putting it in a box and locking it. A message is known if it
can be held in one’s hands. An encrypted message is known because the box can be held.
The content of an encrypted message is known only if the box can be opened (decrypted)
and the content (a stone or another box) taken and held.
This form of message knowledge can be captured fairly easily in any logic without
using heavy technical machinery, since the data required to define message knowledge
is purely local. If we let Messagesi(s) be the set of messages received or intercepted by
agent i in state s of the system, then we can capture message knowledge via a proposition
knows i(m), where i is an agent andm is a message, defined to be true at state s if and only
ifm ∈ Analyzed(Messages i(s)).
Rather than using a dedicated proposition, another approach relies on a dedicated
modal operator to capture message knowledge. Message knowledge as defined above
can be seen as a form of explicit knowledge, often represented by a modal operator Xiϕ,
read agent i explicitly knows ϕ. (Explicit knowledge is to be contrasted with the implicit
knowledge captured by the possible-worlds definition of knowledge.) One form of ex-
plicit knowledge, algorithmic knowledge, uses a local algorithm stored in the local state of
an agent to determine if ϕ is explicitly known to that agent. Thus,Xiϕ is true at a state s if
the local algorithm of agent i says that the agent knows ϕ in state s. If we let proposition
part i(m) be true at a state s when m ∈ Parts(Messagesi(s)), then it is a simple matter to
define a local algorithm to check ifm ∈ Analyzed(Messages i(s)) and capture knowledge of
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messagem viaXi(part i(m)): agent i explicitly knows that messagem is part of the messages she
has received. Thus, part i(m)may be true at a state whileXi(part i(m)) is false at that state if
the message is encrypted with a key that agent i does not know.
A variant of the can see interpretation of message knowledge is to consider instead the
messages that an attacker can create. The set Synthesized(H) of messages that the attacker
can create from a setH of messages is inductively defined by the following inference rules:
m ∈ H
m ∈ Synthesized(H)
m1 ∈ Synthesized(H) m2 ∈ Synthesized(H)
(m1,m2) ∈ Synthesized (H)
m ∈ Synthesized(H) k ∈ Synthesized(H)
{m}k ∈ Synthesized(H)
An alternative interpretation of message knowledge, the attacker knows what she can send
interpretation, can be defined as: an attacker knows message m in a state where she
has received or intercepted a set H of messages if m ∈ Synthesized(Analyzed(H)). Since
Analyzed(H) ⊆ Synthesized(Analyzed(H)), everything an attacker can see she can also
send.
The can send interpretation of message knowledge is tricky, because clearly any agent
can send any plaintext and any key—this is akin to being able to send any password—
and it is easy to inadvertently define nondeterministic attackers that can synthesize any
message. The intent is for attackers to be able to send only messages based on those she
has received or intercepted, but that is a restriction that can be difficult to justify. This
suggests some subtleties in choosing the right definition of message knowledge.
Message knowledge, whether under the can see or can send interpretation, is severely
constrained. It is knowledge of terms, as opposed to knowledge of facts—although terms
can be facts, facts are more general than terms. Message knowledge is conducive to formal
verification using a variety of techniques, mostly because it does not require anything but
looking at the local state of an agent. Indeed, message knowledge is inherently local.
Possible-Worlds Knowledge. The other kind of knowledge that arises in the study of
cryptographic protocols is the standard possible-worlds definition of knowledge via an ac-
cessibility relation over the states of a structure. The Kripke structures interpreting knowl-
edge are usually sets of traces of the protocol and the accessibility relation for agent i is an
equivalence relation over the states of the system that relates two states in which agent i
has the same local state (including having received or intercepted the same messages).
In the presence of cryptography, the standard accessibility relation, meant to capture
when two states are indistinguishable to an agent, seems inappropriate. After all, the
whole point of cryptography is to hide information—and in particular, most cryptographic
definitions say that if an agent receives messagem1 encrypted with a key k1 that she does
not know and message m2 encrypted with key k2 that she also does not know, then that
agent should be unable to distinguish the two messages, in the sense of being able to iden-
tify which is which. Thus, goes the argument, a state where an agent has received {m1}k1
17
and a state where that agent has received {m2}k2 instead should be indistinguishable if k1
and k2 are not known.
To capture a more appropriate definition of state indistinguishability, one approach is
to filter the local states through a function that replaces all messages encrypted with an
unknown key by a special token . More precisely, if H is a set of messages, we write
[H] = {[m]H : m ∈ H}, where [m]H is inductively defined as follows:
[m]H = m ifm is a plaintext
[(m1,m2)]
H = ([m1]
H , [m2]
H)
[{m}k]
H =
{
{[m]H}k if k ∈ Analyzed(H)
 otherwise
The revised equivalence relations ∼i through which knowledge is interpreted can now be
defined to be s ∼i t if and only if [Messages i(s)] = [Messages i(t)].
8
The definition [−]H above, which is typical, uses Analyzed(−) to extract the keys that
the agent knows. Alternate definitions can be given, from a simpler definition that looks
for keys appearing directly in the local state, to a more complex recursive definition de-
fined using possible-worlds knowledge.
Possible-worlds knowledge interpreted via an∼i accessibility relation is general enough
to express message knowledge. If we assume a class of propositions part i(m) as before,
true at a state swhenm ∈ Parts(Messages i(s)), then formulaKi(part i(m)) says that agent
i knows message m—intuitively, she knows that m is part of some message in her local
state, and has access to it.
To see that Ki(part i(m)) corresponds to message knowledge as defined above, we can
relate it to the definition of message knowledge in terms of a local knows i(m) proposi-
tion, using the can see interpretation of message knowledge. It is not difficult to show that
if knows i(m) is true at state s, then Ki(part i(m)) must also be true at state s. The con-
verse direction requires a suitable richness condition that guarantees that there are enough
encrypted messages to compare: for every message {m}k received or intercepted where
k is not known to the agent, there should exist another state in which the agent has re-
ceived {m′}k′ for a different m
′ and a different k′.9 Under such a richness condition, if
Ki(part i(m)) is true at a state s, then knows i(m) is true at that same state s.
Thus, possible-worlds knowledge can be used to express message knowledge, and can
also capture higher-order knowledge, that is, knowledge about general facts, including
other agents’ knowledge. The informal analyses of §2.2 show that it makes sense to state
that Alice may know that Betty knows the key. While Betty’s knowledge here is mes-
sage knowledge (knowledge of the key) and therefore can be modeled with any of the ap-
proaches above, Alice’s knowledge is higher-order knowledge, knowledge about knowl-
edge of another agent. Logics that allow reasoning about Alice’s knowledge of Betty’s
knowledge of the key tend to rely on possible-worlds definitions of knowledge.
8This definition does not account for the possibility that an agent, even if she does not know the content of
an encrypted message, may still recognize that she has already seen that encrypted message. (This is an issue
when encryption is deterministic, so that encryptingm with key k always yields the same string of bits.) One
approach is to refine the definition so that every encryption {m}k is replaced by a unique token m,k .
9To see the need for a richness condition, if there is a single state in which agent i has received an encrypted
message, then Ki(part i(m)) holds vacuously whenm is the content of the encrypted message.
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2.5 Reasoning about Cryptographic Protocols
Several approaches have been developed for reasoning about cryptographic protocols.
Most are not based on epistemic logic, but extend a classical propositional or first-order
logic—possibly with temporal operators—with a simple form of message knowledge in
the spirit of knows i(m). This allows them to leverage well-understood techniques for sys-
tem analysis from the formal verification community and from the programming language
community. Other approaches are explicitly epistemic in nature.
Techniques for reasoning about cryptographic protocols roughly split along two axes,
each corresponding to a way of using logic to reason about protocols in general.
(1) Reasoning can be performed either deductively using the proof theory of the logic
(e.g., through deductions in a theorem prover), or semantically, using the models of
the logic (e.g., through model checking).
(2) Reasoning can be performed either directly on the description of the protocol—either
taken as a sequence of messages or a program for each role in the protocol—or indi-
rectly on the set of traces generated by protocol executions.
Comparing reasoning methods across these axes is difficult, as each have their advantages
and their disadvantages.
The Inductive Method. A good example of a deductive approach for reasoning about
security protocols is the Inductive Method, based on inductive definitions in higher-order
logic (a generalization of first-order predicate logic allowing quantification over arbitrary
relations). These inductive definitions admit powerful induction principles which become
the main proof technique used to establish confidentiality and authentication properties.
The Inductive Method is fairly characteristic of many deductive approaches to cryp-
tographic protocol analysis: the deductive system is embedded in a powerful logic such
as higher-order logic, and does not use epistemic concepts beyond a local definition of
message knowledge equivalent to the use of a knows i(m) proposition.
The Inductive Method proper is based on defining a theory—a set of logical rules—
for analyzing a given protocol. The theory for a protocol describes how to generate the
protocol execution traces, where a trace is a sequence of events such as A sends m to B,
represented by the predicate Say(A,B,m). Rules state which events can possibly follow a
given sequence of events, thereby describing traces inductively. In general, there is a rule
in the theory for every message in the protocol description. Rules inductively define a set
Prot of traces representing all the possible traces of the protocol.
If we consider a theory for Protocol (14), a rule for message (1) would say:
tr ∈ Prot
⇒ 〈tr ,Say(A,B, {A,nA}pkB )〉 ∈ Prot
where 〈tr , e〉 adds event e to trace tr . That is, if tr represents a valid trace of the proto-
col, then that trace can be extended with the first message of a new protocol execution.
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Similarly, a rule for message (2) would say:
tr ∈ Prot
∧ Say(A′, B, {A,nA}pkB ) ∈ tr
⇒ 〈tr ,Say(B,A, {B,nA, nB}pkA)〉 ∈ Prot
That is, if tr is a valid trace of the protocol in which an agent has received the first message
of a protocol execution, that agent can respond appropriately with the second message of
the protocol execution.10 Rules are simply implications and conjunctions over a vocabu-
lary of events.
The attacker S is also defined by rules; these rules describe how attacker actions can
extend traces with new events. For a Dolev-Yao attacker, these rules define a nondeter-
ministic process that can intercept any message, decompose it into parts and decrypt it if
the correct key is known, and that can create new messages from other messages it has
observed. The theory includes inductive definitions for the Analyzed and Synthesized sets
given in §2.4, as well as rules of the form
tr ∈ Prot
∧m ∈ Synthesized(Analyzed(Spied(tr )))
∧B ∈ Agents
⇒ 〈tr ,Say(S,B,m)〉 ∈ Prot
that states that if m can be synthesized from the messages the attacker observed on trace
tr (captured by an inductively-defined set Spied(tr )), then the attacker can add an event
Say(S,B,m) for any agent B to the trace.
The Inductive Method is geared for proving safety properties: for every state in every
trace, that state is not a bad state. A protocol is proved correct by induction on the length
of the traces: choosing the shortest sequence to a bad state, assuming all states earlier on
the trace are good, then deriving a contradiction by showing that any state following these
good states must be good itself.
A confidentiality property such as the attacker never learns message m is established by
making sure that the attacker is unable to ever send messagem, by proving the following
formula:
(∀tr ∈ Prot) (∀B ∈ Agents)Say(S,B,m) 6∈ tr
This is a can send interpretation of message knowledge. Indeed, according to the rules
for the attacker, if the attacker knows message m at any point during a trace, then there
exists a extension of that trace where the attacker sends message m. Thus, showing that
the attacker never learns messagem amounts to showing that there is no trace in which an
event Say(S,B,m) appears, for any agent B.
Abstracting away from the details of the approach, the Inductive Method essentially
relies on rules to describe the evolution of a protocol execution, and verifying a confiden-
tiality property is reduced to verifying that a certain bad state is not reachable. Other ap-
proaches to cryptographic protocol analysis share this methodology, many of them using a
10These rules are simplifications. Actual rules would contain appropriate quantification and additional side
conditions to ensure that A and B are different agents, that nonces do not clash, and so on.
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logic programming language rather than higher-order logic to express protocol evolution
rules; see §6.
BAN Logic. The Inductive Method relies on encoding rules for generating protocol ex-
ecution traces in an expressive general logic suitable for automating inductive proofs. In
contrast, the next approach, BAN Logic, is a logic tailored for reasoning about crypto-
graphic protocols described as a sequence of message exchanges. It has the additional
feature of including a higher-order belief operator as a primitive.
BAN Logic is a logic in the tradition of Hoare Logic, in that it advocates an axiomatic
approach for reasoning about cryptographic protocols. BAN Logic tracks the evolution
of beliefs during the execution of cryptographic protocol, and is described by a set of in-
ference rules for deriving new beliefs from old. BAN Logic includes primitive formulas
stating that k is a shared key known only to A and B (A
k
↔ B), that m is a secret between
A and B (A
m
⇋ B), that agent A believes formula F (A believes F ), that agent A controls
the truth of formula F (A controls F ), that agent A sent a message meaning F (A said F ),
that agent A received and understood a message meaning F (A sees F ), and that a mes-
sage meaning F was created during the current protocol execution (fresh(F )). The precise
semantics of these formulas is given indirectly through inference rules, some of which are
presented below.
BAN Logic assumes that agents can recognize when an encrypted message is one they
have created themselves; encryption is in consequence written {F}ik, where i denotes the
agent who encrypted a message meaning F with key k. (This also highlights another
characteristic of BAN Logic: messages are formulas.)
Here are some of the inference rules of BAN Logic:
(R1)
A believes B
k
↔ A A sees {F}ik i 6= A
A believes B said F
(R2)
A believes B said (F,F ′)
A believes B said F
(R3)
A believes fresh(F ) A believes (B said F )
A believes B believes F
(R4)
A believes B controls F A believes B believes F
A believes F
(R5)
A sees (F,F ′)
A sees F
(R6)
A believes B
k
↔ A A sees {F}ik i 6= A
A sees F
(R7)
A believes fresh(F )
A believes fresh((F ′, F ))
(R8)
A believes B believes (F,F ′)
A believes B believes F
Rule (R1), for instance, says that if agent A believes that k is shared only between B and
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herself, and she receives a message encrypted with key k that she did not encrypt herself,
then she believes that B sent the original message. Rule (R3) is an honesty rule: it says
that agents send messages meaning F only when they believe F . There are commutative
variants of rules (R2), (R5), (R7), and (R8), as well as variants for more general tuples; there
are also variants of (R8) for any level of nested belief.
BAN Logic does not attempt to model protocol execution traces. Reasoning is done di-
rectly on the sequence of messages in the description of the protocol. Because sequences of
messages do not carry enough information to permit this kind of reasoning, a transforma-
tion known as idealization must be applied to the protocol. Roughly speaking, idealization
consists of replacing the messages in the protocol by formulas of BAN Logic that capture
the intent of each message. For instance, if agent A sends key k to agent B with the inten-
tion of sharing a key that is known only to A, then a suitable idealization would have A
send the formula A
k
↔ B to B. Idealization is an annotation mechanism, and as such is
somewhat subjective.
To illustrate reasoning in BAN Logic, consider the following simple protocol in which
Alice sends a secret value m0 to Betty encrypted with their shared key kAB , along with a
nonce exchange to convince B that the message is not a replay of a message in a previous
execution of the protocol (see §2.2):
1. A −→ B : A
2. B −→ A : nB
3. A −→ B : A, {m0, nB}kAB
(15)
A possible idealization of protocol (15) would be:
3′. A −→ B : {A
m0
⇋ B,nB}kAB (16)
The first two messages in protocol (15) carry information that BAN Logic does not use, so
they are not present in the idealized protocol. The third message is idealized to A sending
formula A
m0
⇋ B toB along with the nonce nB, indicating thatA considersm0 to be a secret
at that point.
Reasoning about an idealized protocol consists in laying out the initial beliefs of the
agents, and deriving new beliefs from those and from the messages exchanged between
the agents, using the inference rules of the logic. For protocol (16), initial beliefs include
that both parties believe that key kAB has not been compromised, that nonce nB has not
already been used, and that messagem0 that Awants to send toB is initially secret. These
initial beliefs are captured by the following formulas:
A believes A
kAB↔ B
B believes A
kAB↔ B
B believes fresh(nB)
A believes A
m0
⇋ B
We can derive new formulas from these initial beliefs in combination with the messages
exchanged by the agents. The idea is to update this set of formulas after each protocol step:
22
after an idealized step A → B : F , which says that B receives a message meaning F , we
can add formula B sees F to the set of formulas, and we use the inference rules to derive
additional formulas to add to the set.
For example, in idealized protocol (16), after message (3’), we add formula
B sees {A
m0
⇋ B,nB}kAB (17)
to the set of initial beliefs. Along with the initial belief B believes A
kAB↔ B, formula (17)
allows us to apply inference rule (R1) to derive:
B believes A said (A
m0
⇋ B,nB). (18)
From the initial belief B believes fresh(nB), inference rule (R7) lets us derive that any mes-
sage combined with nB must be fresh, and thus we can derive:
B believes fresh(A
m0
⇋ B,nB). (19)
Formula (19) together with (18) give us, via inference rule (R3):
B believes A believes (A
m0
⇋ B,nB).
Via inference rule (R8), this yields:
B believes A believes A
m0
⇋ B. (20)
Thus, after the messages of the idealized protocol have been exchanged, B believes that A
believes thatm0 is a secret between A and B. This is about as much as we can expect.
We can say more if we are willing to assume that B believes that the secrecy ofm0 is in
fact controlled by A. If so, we can add the following formula to the set of initial beliefs:
B believes A controls A
m0
⇋ B (21)
and formulas (21) and (20) combine via inference rule (R4) to yield the stronger conclusion:
B believes A
m0
⇋ B.
In other words, if B believes that A controls the secrecy ofm0 and also that A believes m0
to be secret, then after the protocol executes B also believes thatm0 is a secret shared only
with A.
Attackers are not explicit in BAN Logic. In a sense, an active Dolev-Yao attacker is
implicitly encoded within the inference rules of the logic, but the focus of BAN Logic is
reasoning about the belief of agents in the presence of an active attacker, as opposed to
reasoning about the knowledge of an attacker. A successful attack in BAN Logic shows up
as a failure to establish a desired belief for one of the agents following a protocol execution.
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Temporal and Epistemic Temporal Logics. Another class of approaches for reasoning
about cryptographic protocols rely on a form of temporal logic to express desired proper-
ties of the protocol and show that they are true of a model representing the protocol—
generally through a suitable representation of its traces. This is done through model-
checking techniques to determine algorithmically whether a formula is true in the models
representing the protocol. These model-checking techniques vary in terms of how the
models are described: these can be either directly expressed by finite state machines, or
through domain-specific languages.
The simplest approaches to cryptographic protocol analysis via temporal logics merely
extend existing temporal-logic verification techniques. At least two challenges arise in
these cases: modeling attackers, and expressing message knowledge. For attackers, while
eavesdropping attackers do not affect the execution of protocols and therefore are compar-
atively easy to handle in standard temporal-logic verification frameworks, active attackers
require work. In some cases, it is possible to simply encode an active attacker within the
model using the tools of the framework. Message knowledge is usually dealt with by
introducing a variant of a knows i(m) proposition.
In general, the logics themselves are completely straightforward: they are standard
propositional or first-order temporal logics extended with a message knowledge predi-
cate. All the action is in the interpretation of the message knowledge predicate, and in
the construction of the models to account for the actions of active attackers. There is not
much to say about those approaches as far as pertains to epistemic concepts, but they are
popular in practice.
More interesting from an epistemic perspective are those frameworks relying on a tem-
poral epistemic logic, that is, a logic with both temporal and epistemic operators. TheMCK
model-checker is an example of a verification framework that uses a linear-time temporal
logic with epistemic operators to verify protocols that do not use cryptography, such as
the Seven Hands or the Dining Cryptographers protocols of §2.1. Protocols are described
via finite state machines, and formulas express properties of paths through that finite state
machine, each such path corresponding to a possible execution of the protocol.
As an example, consider the Dining Cryptographers protocol, which translates well to
a finite state machine. States can be described using three agent-indexed Boolean variables
paid [i], chan [i], and df [i], where variable paid [i] records whether agent i paid;, variable
chan [i] is a communication channel used by agent i to send the result of its coin toss to her
right neighbor, and variable df [i] records the announcement of Df i by agent i at the end of
the protocol. The initial states are all the states satisfying:
(¬paid[1] ∧ ¬paid[2] ∧ ¬paid[3]) ∨ (paid[1] ∧ ¬paid[2] ∧ ¬paid[3])
∨ (¬paid[1] ∧ paid[2] ∧ ¬paid[3]) ∨ (¬paid[1] ∧ ¬paid[2] ∧ paid[3])
Every agent executes the following program, where a single step of the program for each
agent is executed in a transition of the state machine:
protocol diningcrypto (paid : observable Bool,
chan_left, chan_right : Bool,
df : observable Bool[])
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coin_left, coin_right : observable Bool
begin
if True -> coin_right := True
[] True -> coin_right := False
fi;
chan_right.send(coin_right);
coin_left := chan_left.recv();
df[self] := coin_left xor coin_right xor paid;
end
Program diningcrypto11 is instantiated for every agent with suitable variables for the
parameters:
agent 1 executes diningcrypto (paid [1],chan [1],chan [2],df )
agent 2 executes diningcrypto (paid [2],chan [2],chan [3],df )
agent 3 executes diningcrypto (paid [3],chan [3],chan [1],df )
At the first state transition, every agent nondeterministically chooses a value for their coin
toss into local variable coin right; at the second state transition, the result of the coin
toss is sent on the channel given as the chan right parameter; at the third state transition,
the local variable coin left for each agent is updated to reflect the result of the coin toss
received from the agent’s left neighbor; at the fourth state transition, variable df is updated
for every agent.
Given such a state machine, a formula expressing the anonymity of the payer from
agent 1’s perspective can be written as:
X
4 (¬paid [1]
⇒ (K1(¬paid [1] ∧ ¬paid [2] ∧ ¬paid [3]))
∨ (K1(paid [2] ∨ paid [3]) ∧ ¬K1paid [2] ∧ ¬K1paid [3]))
where X4 is a temporal operator meaning after four rounds. This formula, which is true or
false of an initial state, says that after the protocol terminates, if cryptographer 1 did not
pay, then she either knows that no cryptographer paid, or she knows that one of the other
two cryptographers paid but does not knowwhich. (Formulas expressing anonymity from
agent 2 and agent 3’s perspectives are similar.)
MCK has no built-in support for active attackers, so it cannot easily deal with crypto-
graphic protocols even if we were to add a message knowledge primitive to the language
that can deal with encrypted messages. Of course, it is possible to encode some attack-
ers within the language that MCK provides for describing models, but the effect on the
efficiency of model checking is unclear.
11The observable annotation is used to derive the indistinguishability relation: two states are indistin-
guishable to agent i if the observable variables of the program executed by agent i have the same value in
both states. The if ... [] ... fi construct nondeterministically executes one of its branches with an associated
condition that evaluates to true. Variable self is assigned the name of the agent executing the program.
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The theoretical underpinnings ofmodel checking for temporal epistemic logic are fairly
well understood, even though the problem has not been studied nearly as much as model
checking for temporal logics. Message knowledge does not particularly complicate mat-
ters, once the choice of how to interpret message knowledge is made. Accounting for
active attackers is more of an issue, since active attackers introduce additional actions into
the model, increasing its size.
The main difficulty with model checking epistemic temporal logic is its inherent com-
plexity. While model checking a standard epistemic logic such as S5 takes time polynomial
in the size of themodel, adding temporal operators and interpreting the logic over the pos-
sibly infinite paths in a finite state machine increases that complexity. For example, in the
presence of perfect recall (when agents remember their full history) and synchrony (when
agents have access to a global clock), the model-checking problem has non-elementary
complexity if the logic includes an until temporal operator, and is PSPACE-complete oth-
erwise. The problem tends to become PSPACE-complete when perfect recall is dropped.
Progress has been made to control the complexity of model-checking epistemic temporal
logics by a careful analysis of the complexity of specific classes of formulas that, while re-
stricted, are still sufficiently expressive to capture interesting security properties, but much
work remains to be done to make the resulting techniques efficient.
3 Information Flow in Multi-Level Systems
Confidentiality in cryptographic protocols is mainly viewed through the lens of access
control: some privilege (a key) is required in order to access the confidential data (the
content of an encrypted message). An agent who has the key can access the content,
an agent without the key cannot. Those access restrictions can control the release of in-
formation, but once that information is released there is nothing stopping it from being
propagated by agents or by the system through error or malice, or because the released
information is needed for the purpose of computations. For systems in which confiden-
tiality is paramount, it is not sufficient to simply ensure that access to confidential data
is controlled, there also needs to be a guarantee that even when the confidential data is
released it does not land in unauthorized hands. These sorts of confidentiality guarantees
require understanding the flow of information in a system.
Confidentiality in the presence of released information is usually studied in the con-
text of systems in which all data are classified with a security level, and where agents have
security clearances allowing them to access data at their security level or lower. For sim-
plicity, only scenarios with security levels high and low (think classified and unclassified in
military settings) will be considered. Intuitively, a high-security agent should be allowed
to read both high- and low-security data, and a low-security agent should be allowed to
read only low-security data. This is an example of security policy, which describes the
forms of information flows that are allowed and those that are disallowed. Information
flows that are disallowed capture the desired confidentiality guarantee.
As an example, imagine a commercial system such as a bank mainframe, where agents
perform transactions via credit cards or online accounts. In such a system, credit card num-
bers and bank account numbers might be considered high-security data, and low-security
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agents should be prevented from accessing them. However, what about the last four digits
of a credit card number? Even that information is often considered sensitive. What about a
single digit? What about the digits frequency in any given credit card number? Because it
is in general difficult to characterize exactly what kind of information about high-security
data should not be leaked to low-security agents, it is often easier to prevent any kind of
partial information disclosure.
The problem of preventing information disclosure is made more interesting, and more
complicated, by the fact that information may not only flow directly from one point to
another (e.g, by an agent sending a message to another, or by information being posted,
or by updating an observable memory location) but may also flow indirectly from one
point to another. Suppose that the commercial system described above sends an email
to a central location whenever a transfer of more than one million dollars into a given
account A occurs. Anyone observing email traffic can see those emails being sent and
learn that account A now contains at least a million dollars. This is an extreme example,
but it illustrates indirect information flow: information is gained not by directly observing
an event, but by correlating an observation with the event.
Epistemic concepts arise naturally in this setting—a security policy saying that there is
no flow of information from high-security data to low-security agents can be expressed as
low-security agents do not learn anything about high-security data. Moreover, the definitions
used in the literature essentially rely on a possible-worlds definition of knowledge within
a specific class of models.
Two distinct models of information flow will be described. Both of these models are
observational models: they define the kind of observations that agents can make about the
system and about the activity of other agents. These observations form the basis of agents’
knowledge.
The first model considered takes a fairly abstract view of a system, as sequences of
events such as inputs from agents, outputs to agents, internal computation, and so on.
These events are the observations that agents can make. In such a setting, security poli-
cies regulate information about the occurrence of events. The second model considered
is more concrete, and stems from practical work on defining verification techniques for
information flow at the level of the source code implementing a system. In that model,
observations take the form of content of memory locations that programs can manipulate.
3.1 Information Flow in Event Systems
The first model of information flow uses sets of traces corresponding to the possible exe-
cutions of the system. Every trace is a sequence of events; some of those events are high-
security events (and only observable by high-security agents), and some of those events are
low-security events (and observable by both high-security and low-security agents). The
intuition is that a low-security agent, observing only the low-security events in a trace,
should not be able to infer any information about the high-security events in a trace.
How can a low-security agent infer information? If we assume that the full set of traces
of the system is known to all agents, then a low-security agent, upon observing a particular
sequence of low-security events, can narrow down a set of possible traces that could be
the actual trace by considering all the traces that are compatible with her view of the low-
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security events. By looking at those possible traces, she may infer information about high-
security events. For instance, maybe a particular high-security event e appears in every
such possible trace, and thus she learns that high-security event e has occurred. In themost
extreme case, there may be a single trace compatible with her view of the low-security
events, and therefore that low-security agent learns exactly which high-security events
have occurred.
The model can be formalized using event systems. An event system is a tuple S =
(E, I,O,Tr ) where E is a set of events, I ⊆ E a set of input events, O ⊆ E a set of output
events, andTr ⊆ E∗ a set of finite traces representing the possible executions of the system.
Given a trace τ ∈ E∗ and a subset E′ ⊆ E of events, we write τ |E′ for the subtrace of τ
consisting of events from E′ only.
We assign a security level to events in E by partitioning them into low-security events
L and high-security eventsH : events in I∩L are low-security input events, events inO∩L
are low-security output events, and so on.
A naive attempt at defining information flow in this setting might be to say that there
is information flowing from high-security events to low-security agents if a low-security
agent’s view of τ |L implies that at least one high-security event subsequence is not pos-
sible. In other words, seeing a particular sequence of low-security events rules out one
possible high-security event subsequence. Formally, if we write Tr |H for {τ |H : τ ∈ Tr},
information flows from high-security events to low-security agents if there is a trace τ ∈ Tr
such that {τ ′|H : τ
′|L = τ |L} 6= Tr |H .
Such a definition turns out to be too strong—it is equivalent to separability described
below—because it pinpoints information flows where there are none: since low-security
eventsmay influence high-security events, a particular subsequence of high-security events
may be ruled out due to the influence of low-security events, and in that case there should
be no information flow since the low-security agent could have already predicted that the
high-security subsequence would have been ruled out. Intuitively, there is information
flow when one high-security event subsequence that should be possible as far as the low-
security agent expects is not in fact possible. This argument gives an inkling as to why the
definition of information flow is not entirely trivial.
Security policies in event systems are often defined as closure properties of the set
of traces. Security policies that historically were deemed interesting for the purpose of
formalizing existing multi-level systems include the following:
• Separability: no nontrivial interaction betweenhigh-security events and low-security
agents is possible because for any such interaction there is a trace with the same
high-security events but different low-security events, and a trace with the same
low-security events but different high-security events. Formally, for every pair of
traces τ1, τ2 ∈ Tr , there is a trace τ ∈ Tr such that τ |L = τ1|L and τ |H = τ2|H .
• Noninference: a low-security agent cannot learn about the occurrence of high-security
events because any trace, as far as the low-security agent can tell, could be a trace
where there are no high-security events at all. Formally, for all traces τ ∈ Tr , there is
a trace τ ′ ∈ Tr such that τ |L = τ
′|L and τ
′|H = 〈 〉.
• Generalized Noninference: A more lenient form of noninference, where a low-
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security agent cannot learn about the occurrence of high-security input events be-
cause any trace could be a trace where there are no high-security input events at all.
Formally, for all traces τ ∈ Tr , there is a trace τ ′ ∈ Tr such that τ |L = τ
′|L and
τ ′|(H∩I) = 〈 〉.
• Generalized Noninterference: a low-security agent cannot learn about high-security
input events, and high-security input events cannot influence low-security events.
Formally, for all traces τ ∈ Tr and all traces τ ′ ∈ interleave((H ∩ I)∗, {τ |L}), there
is a τ ′′ ∈ Tr such that τ ′′|L = τ |L and τ
′′|(L∪(H∩I)) = τ
′. (Function interleave(T,U)
returns every possible interleaving of every trace from T with every trace from U .)
A closure property says that if some traces are in the model, then other variations on
these traces must also be in the model. This is clearly an epistemic property. Under a
possible-worlds definition of knowledge, an agent knows a formula if that formula is true
at all traces that the agent considers possible given her view of the system. In general, the
fewer possible traces there are, the more facts can be known, since it it easier for a fact to
be true at all possible traces if there are few of them. The closure properties ensure that
there are enough possible traces from the perspective of a low-security agent to prevent a
specific of class facts from being known.12
Closure conditions on sets of traces are therefore just a way to enforce lack of knowl-
edge, given a possible-worlds definition of knowledge. We can make this precise by view-
ing event systems as Kripke frames.
The accessibility relation of each agent depends on the agent’s security level. In the
case of interest, a low-security agent is assigned an accessibility relation ∼L defined as
τ1 ∼L τ2 if and only if τ1|L = τ2|L.
We identify a proposition with a set of traces, intuitively, those traces in which the
proposition is true. As usual, conjunction is intersection of propositions, disjunction is
union of propositions, negation is complementation of propositions with respect to the
full set of traces in the event system, and implication is subset inclusion. To define the
proposition the low-security agent knows P , we first define the low-security agent’s knowl-
edge set of a trace τ as the set of all traces ∼L-equivalent to τ , KL(τ) = {τ
′ : τ ∼L τ
′}. The
proposition the low-security agent knows P can be defined in the usual way, as:
KL(P ) = {τ : KL(τ) ⊆ P}
It is easy to see that KL satisfies the usual S5 axioms, suitably modified to account for
propositions being sets:
(D) KL(P ) ∩ KL(Q) = KL(P ∩Q)
(K) KL(P ) ⊆ P
(PI) KL(P ) ⊆ KL(KL(P ))
(NI) ¬KL(P ) ⊆ KL(¬KL(P ))
These properties are the set-theoretic analogues of Distribution, Knowledge, Positive Intro-
spection, and Negative Introspection, respectively.
12As in §2, this does not take probabilistic information into account.
29
As an example, consider an event system (E, I,O,Tr ) that satisfies generalized non-
interference, and the proposition high-security input event e has occurred. This proposition
is represented by the set Pe of all traces in Tr in which e occurs. The proposition the low-
security agent knows that e has occurred corresponds to the set of traces KL(Pe). It is easy
to check that because the system satisfies generalized noninterference, the set KL(Pe) is
empty, meaning that there is no trace on which the low-security agent ever knows Pe, that
is, that e has occurred. By way of contradiction, suppose that τ ∈ KL(Pe). By definition,
τ ∈ KL(Pe) if and only if KL(τ) ⊆ Pe. But the closure condition for generalized noninter-
ference implies that there must exist a trace τ ′ ∼L τ , that is, a trace in KL(τ), such that e
does not occur in τ ′. Thus, there is a trace in KL(τ) which is not in Pe, and KL(τ) 6⊆ Pe.
Thus, τ 6∈ KL(Pe), a contradiction.
This is a somewhat roundabout way to see that there is an implicit epistemic logic
lurking which explains the notions of information flow security policies in event systems.
It is certainly possible to make such a logic explicit by introducing a syntax and adding an
interpretation to event systems, and study information flow in event systems from such a
perspective.
The key point here is that event-systemmodels of information flow and the expression
of security policies in those models intrinsically use epistemic concepts, and all reasoning
is essentially classical epistemic reasoning performed directly on the models.
3.2 Language-Based Noninterference
Amore concrete model for information flow is obtained by moving away from trace-based
models of systems and relying instead on the program code implementing those systems.
Defining information flow at the level of programs has several advantages: the system
is described in detail, information can be defined in terms of the data explicitly manipu-
lated by the program, and enforcement can be automated; the latter turns out to be espe-
cially important given the complexity of modern computing systemswhich makes manual
analysis often infeasible.
The observational model used by most language-based information-flow security re-
search is not event-based, although it is still broadly concerned with input and output.
The focus here is on information flow in imperative programs, which operates by chang-
ing the state of the environment as a program executes. The state of the environment is
represented by a store holding values associated with variables. Variables can be read and
written by programs. Every variable is taggedwith a security level, describing the security
level of the data it contains. A low-security agent can observe all low-security variables,
but not the high-security ones. Inputs to programs are modeled as initial values of vari-
ables, while outputs are modeled as final value of variables: low-security inputs are initial
value of low-security variables, and so on. The basic security policy generally considered
is a form of noninterference: that low-security outputs do not reveal anything about high-
security inputs, and that high-security inputs do not influence the value of low-security
outputs.
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Consider the following short programs:
(P1) h := l + 1
(P2) l := h+ 1
(P3) if l = 0 then h := h+ 1 else l := l + 1
(P4) if h = 0 then h := h+ 1 else l := l + 1
In all of these programs, variable h is a high-security variable, and variable l is a low-
security variable.
A program executes in a store assigning initial values to variables, and execution steps
modify the store until the program terminates in a final store. Several simplifying assump-
tion are made: programs are deterministic, and programs always terminate. This is purely
to keep the discussion and the technical machinery light. These restrictions can be lifted
easily. Moreover, the programming language under consideration will not be described in
detail; the sample programs should be intuitive enough.
How do we formalize noninterference in this setting? A store σ is a mapping from
variables x to values σ(x). We assume every variable x is tagged with a security level
sec(x) ∈ {L,H}. LetΣ be the set of all possible stores. Wemodel execution of a program C
using a function [[C]] : Σ −→ Σ from initial stores to final stores. Thus, executing program
C in store σ yields a final store [[C]](σ). For example, executing program (P1) in store 〈l 7→
5, h 7→ 10〉 yields store 〈l 7→ 5, h 7→ 6〉, and executing program (P3) in store 〈l 7→ 5, h 7→ 10〉
yields store 〈l 7→ 6, h 7→ 10〉.
Two stores σ1 and σ2 are L-equivalent, written σ1 ≈L σ2, if they assign the same values
to the same low-security variables: σ1 ≈L σ2 if and only if for all variables xwith sec(x) =
L, σ1(x) = σ2(x). A programC satisfies noninterference if executingC in twoL-equivalent
states (that is, in two states that a low-security agent cannot distinguish) yields two L-
equivalent states: for all σ1 and σ2, if σ1 ≈L σ2, then [[C]](σ1) ≈L [[C]](σ2).
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How do programs (P1–4) fare under this definition of noninterference? Program (P1)
clearly satisfies noninterference, since the final value of low-security variable l does not
depend on the value of any high-level variable, while program (P2) clearly does not. The
other two programs are more interesting. The final value of low-security variable l in
program (P3) only depends on the initial value of l, and thus we expect (P3) to satisfy
noninterference, and it does. Program (P4), however, does not, as we can see by executing
the program in stores 〈l 7→ 0, h 7→ 0〉 and 〈l 7→ 0, h 7→ 1〉, both ≈L-equivalent, but which
yield stores 〈l 7→ 0, h 7→ 1〉 and 〈l 7→ 1, h 7→ 1〉, respectively, two stores that cannot be
L-equivalent since they differ in the value they assign to variable l. And indeed, observing
the final value of l reveals information about the initial value of h.
Noninterference is usually established by a static analysis of the program code, which
approximates the flow of information through a program before execution. While the de-
tails of the static analyses are interesting in their own right, they have little to do with
epistemic logic beyond providing an approach to verifying a specific kind of epistemic
property in a specific context.
13Another way of understanding this definition is that it requires the relation on stores induced by program
execution to be a refinement of L-equivalence ≈L. If we define [[C]]≈L as the relation {([[C]](σ1), [[C]](σ2)) :
σ1 ≈L σ2}, then the noninterference condition can be rephrased as [[C]]≈L ⊆ ≈L.
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Recent work on language-based information-flow security has highlighted the practi-
cal importance of declassification, that is, the controlled release of high-security data to
low-security agents. The problem of password-based authentication illustrates the need
for such release: when a low-security agent tries to authenticate herself as a high-security
agent, she may be presented with a login screen asking for the password of the high-
security agent. That password should of course be considered high-security information.
However, the login screen leaks information, since entering an incorrect password will
reveal that the attempted password is not the right password, thereby leaking a small
amount of information about the correct password. The leak is small, but it exists, and be-
cause of it the login screen does not satisfy the above definition of noninterference. Defin-
ing a suitable notion of security policy that allows such small release of information while
still preventing more important information flow is a complex problem.
While the concepts underlying information-flow security are clearly epistemic in nature—
taking stores as possible worlds and L-equivalence as an accessibility relation for low-
security agents—there is no real demand for an explicit epistemic logic in which to de-
scribe policies. One reason is that it is in general difficult to precisely nail down, in a given
system, what high-security information should be kept from low-security agents. It is sim-
ply easier to ask that no information be leaked to low-security agents. This no information
condition is easier to state semantically than through an explicit logical language—not
learning any information in the sense of noninterference can be stated straightforwardly
as a relationship between equivalence relations, while if we were to use an epistemic logic,
we would have to say something along the lines of for all formulas ϕ that do not depend only
on the state of the low-security agent, ¬KLϕ where KL expresses the knowledge of that low-
security agent. The latter is patently clunkier to work with. It may be the case that an
explicit epistemic logic would be more useful in the context of declassification, where not
all information needs to be kept from low-security agents.
4 Beyond Confidentiality
The focus of this chapter has been on confidentiality, because it is by far the most studied
security property. It is not only important, it also underpins several other security proper-
ties. Other related properties are also relevant.
Anonymity. A specific form of confidentiality is anonymity, where the information to be
kept secret is the association between actions and agents who perform them. Anonymity
has been studied using epistemic logic, and several related definitions have been proposed
and debated.
To discuss anonymity, we need to be able to talk about actions and agents who perform
them. Let δ(i, a) be a proposition interpreted as agent i performed action a.
The simplest definition of anonymity is lack of knowledge: action a performed by agent
i is minimally anonymous with respect to agent j if agent j does not know that agent i
performed a. This can be captured by the formula
¬Kjδ(i, a).
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Minimal anonymity is, well, minimal. It does not rule out that agent j may narrow
down the list of possible agents that performed a to agent i and one other agent. Stronger
forms of anonymity can be defined: action a performed by agent i is totally anonymous
with respect to agent j if, as far as agent j is concerned, action a could have been performed
by any agent in the system (except for agent j). This can be captured by the formula
δ(i, a) ⇒
∧
i′ 6=j
Pjδ(i
′, a)
where Piϕ is the usual dual to knowledge, ¬Ki(¬ϕ), read as agent i considers ϕ possible.
Total anonymity is at the other extreme on the spectrum from minimal anonymity; it
is a very strong requirement. Intermediate definitions can be obtained by requiring that
actions be anonymous only up to a given set of agents—sometimes called an anonymity
set: action a performed by agent i is anonymous up to I with respect to agent j if, as far as
agent j is concerned, action a could have been performed by any agent in I . This can be
captured by the formula:
δ(i, a) ⇒
∧
i′∈I
Pjδ(i
′, a).
As an example of this last definition of anonymity, note that it can be used to describe
the anonymity provided by the Dining Cryptographers protocol from §2.1. Recall that
if one of the cryptographers paid, the Dining Cryptographers protocol guarantees that
each of the non-paying cryptographers think it possible that any of the cryptographers but
herself paid. In other words, if C = {Alice,Betty ,Charlene} are the cryptographers and
if cryptographer i paid, then the protocol guarantees that the paying action is anonymous
up to C \ {j} with respect to cryptographer j, as long as j 6= i.
Coercion Resistance. Voting protocols are protocols in which anonymity plays an impor-
tant role. Voting protocols furthermore satisfy other interesting security properties. Aside
from secrecy of votes (that every voter’s choice should be private, and observers should
not be able to figure out who voted how), other properties include fairness (voters do not
have any knowledge of the distribution of votes until the final tallies are announced), ver-
ifiability (every voter should be able to check whether her vote was counted properly),
and receipt freeness (no voter has the means to prove to another that she has voted in a
particular manner).
This last property, receipt freeness, is particularly interesting in terms of epistemic con-
tent. Roughly speaking, receipt freeness says that a voter Alice cannot prove to a potential
coercer Corinna that she voted in a particular way. This is the case even if Alice wishes to
cooperate with Corinna; receipt freeness guarantees that such cooperation cannot lead to
anything because it will be impossible for Corinna to be certain how Alice voted. In that
sense, receipt freeness goes further than secrecy of votes. Even if Alice tells Corinna that
she voted a certain way, Corinna has no way to verify Alice’s assertion, and Alice has no
way to convince her.
Coercion resistance is closely related to receipt freeness but is slightly stronger. Intu-
itively, a voting protocol is coercion resistant if it prevents voter coercion and vote buying
even by active coercers: a coercer should not be able to influence the behavior of a voter.
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Coercion resistance can be modeled epistemically, although the details of the modeling is
subtle, and many important details will be skipped in the description below. Part of the
difficulty and subtlety is that the idea of coercion means changing how a voter behaves
based on a coercer’s desired outcome or goal, which needs to be modeled somehow.
One formalization of coercion resistance uses a model of voting protocols based on
traces, where some specific agents are highlighted: a voter that the coercer tries to influence
(called the coerced voter), the coercer, and the remaining agents and authorities, assumed
to be honest. Every voter in the system votes according to a voting strategy, which in the
case of honest voters is the strategy corresponding to the voting protocol.
The formalization assumes that every voter has a specific voting goal, formally cap-
tured by the set of traces in which that voter successfully votes according to her desired
voting goal. The coercer, however, is intent on affecting the coerced voter—for instance, to
coerce a vote for a given candidate, or perhaps to coerce a vote away from a given candi-
date. To coerce a voter, the coercer hands the coerced voter a particular strategy that will
fulfill the coercer’s goals instead of the coerced voter’s. For instance, the coercer’s strategy
may simply be one that forwards all messages to and from the coercer, effectively making
the coerced voter a proxy for the coercer.
Let V be the space of possible strategies that voters and coercers can follow. Coercion
resistance can be defined by saying that for every possible strategy v ∈ V , there is another
strategy v′ ∈ V that the coerced voter can use instead of v with the property that: (1) the
voter always achieves her goal by using v′, and (2) the coercer does not know whether the
coerced voter used strategy v or v′. In other words, in every trace in which the coerced
voter uses strategy v, the coercer considers it possible, given her view of the trace, that
the coerced voter is using strategy v′ instead. Conversely, in every trace in which the
coerced voter uses strategy v′, the coercer considers it possible that the coerced voter is
using strategy v. So, the coercer cannot know whether the coerced voter followed the
coercer’s instructions (i.e., used v) or tried to achieve her own goal (i.e., used v′). As in
the case of information flow in event systems in §3.1, the definition of coercion resistance
is a form of closure property on traces, which corresponds to lack of knowledge in the
expected way, where knowledge is captured by an indistinguishability relation on states
based on the coercer’s observations.
Zero Knowledge. The property an agent does not learn anything about something, as embod-
ied in information-flow security policies and other forms of confidentiality, is generally
modeled using an indistinguishability relation over states and enforced by making sure
that there are enough states to prevent the confidential information from being known by
unauthorized agents.
Another approach to modeling and enforcing this lack of learning is demonstrated by
zero knowledge interactive proof systems. An interactive proof system for a string language L
is a two-party system (P, V ) in which a prover P tries to convince a verifier V that some
string x is in L through a sequence of message exchanges amounting to an interactive
proof of x ∈ L. Classically, the prover is assumed to be infinitely powerful, while the
verifier is assumed to be a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. An interactive
proof system has the property that if x ∈ L, the conversation between P and V will show
x ∈ L with high probability, and if x 6∈ L, the conversation between any prover and V will
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show x ∈ L with low probability. (The details for why the second condition refers to any
prover rather than just P is beyond the scope of this discussion.)
An interactive proof system for L is zero knowledge if whenever x ∈ L holds the
verifier is able to generate on its own the conversations it would have had with the prover
during an interactive proof of x ∈ L. The intuition here is that the verifier does not learn
anything from a conversation with the prover (other than x ∈ L) if it can learn exactly the
same thing by generating that whole conversation itself. Thus, the only knowledge gained
by the verifier is that which the prover initially set out to prove.
Zero knowledge interactive proof systems rely on indistinguishability, but not indis-
tinguishability among a large set of states. Rather, it is indistinguishability between two
scenarios: a scenario where the verifier interacts with the prover, and a scenario where
the verifier does not interact with the prover but instead simulates a complete interaction
with the prover. This simulation paradigm, a core notion in modern theoretical computer
science, says roughly that an agent does not gain any knowledge from interacting with
the outside world if she can achieve the same results without interacting with the outside
world.
To give a sense of the kinds of definitions that arise in this context, here is one formal
definition of perfect zero knowledge:
Let (P, V ) be an interactive proof system for L, where P (the prover) is an in-
teractive Turing machine and V (the verifier) is a probabilistic polynomial-time
interactive Turing machine. System (P, V ) is perfect zero-knowledge if for every
probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machine V ∗ there is a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time Turing machineM∗ (the simulator) such that for every
x ∈ L the following two random variables are identically distributed:
(i) the output of V ∗ interacting with P on common input x;
(ii) the output of machineM∗ on input x.
While the details are beyond the scope of this chapter, the intuition behind this definition
is to have, for every possible verifier V ∗ (and not only V ) interacting with P , a machineM∗
that can simulate the interaction of V ∗ and P even though it does not have access to the
prover P . The existence of such simulators implies that V ∗ does not gain any knowledge
from P .
This gives a different epistemic foundation for confidentiality, one that is intimately
tied to computation and its complexity. The relationship with classical epistemic logic is
essentially unexplored.
5 Perspectives
The preceding sections illustrate how extensively epistemic concepts, explicitly framed as
an epistemic logic or not, have been applied to security research. Whether the application
of these concepts has been successful is a more subjective question.
In a certain sense, the problems described in this chapter are solved problems by now.
Confidentiality and authentication in cryptographic protocol analysis under a formalmodel
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of cryptography and Dolev-Yao attackers, for example, can be checked quite efficiently
with a vast array of methods, at least for common security properties, and the definitions
used approximate the epistemic definitions quite closely.
So what are the remaining challenges in cryptographic protocol analysis, and has epis-
temic logic a role to play? The most challenging aspect of cryptographic protocol analysis
is to move beyond Dolev-Yao attackers and beyond formal models of cryptography, to-
wards more concrete models of cryptography.
Moving beyond a Dolev-Yao attacker requires shifting the notion of message knowl-
edge to use richer algebras of message with more operations. Directions that have been
explored include providing attackers with the ability to perform offline dictionary attacks,
working with an XOR operation, or even number-based operations such as exponentia-
tion. One problem is that when the algebra of messages is subject to too many algebraic
properties, determining whether an attacker knows a message may quickly become un-
decidable. Even when message knowledge for an attacker is decidable, it may still be too
complex for efficient reasoning. It is not entirely clear how epistemic concepts can help
solve problems in that arena.
Moving from a formal model of cryptography to a concrete model, one that reflects real
encryption schemes more accurately using sequences of bits and computational indistin-
guishability, requires completely shifting the approach to cryptographic protocol analysis.
Formal models of cryptography work by abstracting away the one-way security prop-
erty of encryption schemes—that it is computationally hard to recover the sourcetext from
a ciphertext without knowing the encryption key. More concrete models of cryptogra-
phy rely on stronger properties than one-way security, properties such as semantic security,
which intuitively says that if any information about a message m can be computed by an
efficient algorithm given the ciphertext ek(m) for a random k andm chosen according to an
arbitrary probability distribution, that same information can be computed without know-
ing the ciphertext. In other words, the ciphertext ek(m) offers no advantage in computing
information about some messagem chosen from an arbitrary probability distribution.
The definition of semantic security is reminiscent of the definition of zero knowledge
interactive proof systems in §4, and it is no accident, as they both rely on a simulation
paradigm to express the fact that no knowledge is gained. As in the case of zero knowledge
interactive proof systems, there is a clear epistemic component to the definition of semantic
security, one to which classical epistemic logic has not been applied.
The main difficulty with applying classical epistemic logic to concrete models of cryp-
tography is that these models take attackers to be probabilistic polynomial-time Turing
machines, and take security properties to be probabilistic properties relative to those prob-
abilistic polynomial-time Turing machines. This means that an epistemic approach to
concrete models of cryptography needs to be probabilistic as well as computationally
bounded. The former is not a problem, since probabilistic reasoning shares much of the
same foundations as epistemic reasoning. But the latter is more complicated. Concrete
models of cryptography are not based on impossibility, but on computational hardness.
And while possible-worlds definitions of knowledge are well suited to talking about im-
possible versus possible outcomes, they fare less well at talking about difficult versus easy
outcomes.
The trouble that possible-worlds definitions of knowledge run into when trying to in-
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corporate a notion of computational difficulty is really the problem of logical omniscience
in epistemic logic under a different guise. Agents, under standard possible-worlds def-
initions of knowledge, know all tautologies, and know all logical consequences of their
knowledge: if Kϕ is true and ϕ ⇒ ψ is valid, then Kψ is also true. Any normal epis-
temic operator will satisfy these properties, and in particular, any epistemic logic based
on Kripke structures will satisfy these properties. Normality does not deal well with com-
putational difficulty, because while it may be computationally difficult to establish that
ϕ ⇒ ψ is valid, a normal modal logic will happily derive all knowledge-based conse-
quences of that valid formula. It would seem that giving a satisfactory epistemic account
of concrete models of cryptography requires a non-normal epistemic logic, one that sup-
ports a form of resource-bounded knowledge. Resource-bounded knowledge is not well
understood, and logics for resource-bounded knowledge still feel too immature to form a
solid basis for reasoning about concrete models of cryptography.
Leaving aside concrete models of cryptography, it is almost impossible to discuss epis-
temic logic in the context of cryptographic protocols without addressing the issue of BAN
Logic. BAN Logic is an interesting and original use of logic, developed to prove cryp-
tographic protocol properties manually by paralleling informal arguments for protocol
correctness.
BAN Logic has spilled a lot of virtual ink. Aside from its technical limitations—it re-
quires a protocol idealization step that remains outside the purview of the logic but affects
the results of analysis—the logic is considered somewhat passe´. Other approaches we saw
in §2.5 operate in the same space, namely analyzing cryptographic protocols under a for-
mal model of cryptography in the presence of Dolev-Yao attackers, and most are less lim-
ited and more easily automated. Other approaches, such as Protocol Composition Logic,
even advocate Hoare-style reasoning about the protocol text fromwithin the logic, just like
BAN Logic.
My perspective on BAN Logic is that it tried to do something which has not really
been tried since, something that remains a sort of litmus test for our understanding of se-
curity in cryptographic protocols: identifying high-level primitives that capture relevant
concepts for security, high-level primitives that match our intuitive understanding of se-
curity properties, those same intuitions that guide our design of cryptographic protocols
in the first place. We do not have such high-level primitives in any other framework, all of
which tend to work at much lower levels of abstraction. The primitives in BAN Logic are
intuitively attractive, but poorly understood. The continuing conversation on BAN Logic
is a reminder that we still do not completely understand the basic concepts and basic terms
needed to discuss cryptographic protocols, and I think BANLogic remains relevant, if only
as a nagging voice telling us that we have not quite gotten it right yet.
Many of the issues that arise when trying to push cryptographic protocol analysis from
a formal model of cryptography to a more concrete model also come up in the context of
information-flow security. As mentioned in §3.2, recent work has turned to the question
of declassification, or controlled release of information. The reason for this is purely prag-
matic: most applications need to release some kind of information in order to do any useful
work, even under a lax interpretation of noninterference.
But it does not take long to see that even a controlled release of information can lead
to unwanted release of information in the aggregate. Returning to the password-login
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problem from §3.2, it is clear that every wrong attempt at entering a password leaks some
information, something that needs to happen if the login screen is to operate properly. But
of course, repeated attempts at checking the password will eventually lead to the correct
password as the only remaining possibility, which is a severe undesirable release of infor-
mation. Security policies controlling declassification therefore seem to require a way to
account for more quantitative notions of leakage which aggregate over time, something
that symbolic approaches to information-flow security have difficulty handling well.
Modeling information flow quantitatively can be seen as a move from reasoning about
information as a monolithic unit to reasoning about information as a resource. Once we
make that leap, other resources affecting information flow start suggesting themselves. For
example, execution time can leak information. Consider the simple program:
if (high-security Boolean variable)
then fast code
else slow code
By observing the execution time of the program, we can determine the value of the high-
security Boolean variable. This example is rather silly, of course, but it illustrates the point
that information leakage can occur based on observations of other resources than simply
the state of memory.
What about the combination of information flow and cryptography? After all, in prac-
tice, systems do use cryptography internally to help keep data confidential. Encrypted
data can presumably be written on shared storage (which might be easier to manage than
storage segregated into high-security and low-security storage) or moved online, or in gen-
eral given to low-security agentswithout information being released, as long as they do not
have the key or the resources to decrypt. Accounting for cryptography in information-flow
security raises questions similar to those in cryptographic protocol analysis concerning
what models of cryptography to use and how to account for the cryptographic capabilities
of attackers. It also raises difficulties similar to those in cryptographic protocol analysis
when trying to move from a formal model of cryptography to a concrete model, including
how to provide an epistemic foundation for information flow using a resource-bounded
definition of knowledge.
Conclusion. Epistemic concepts are central to many aspects of reasoning about security.
In some cases, these epistemic concepts may even naturally take expression in a bona fide
epistemic logic that can be used to formalize the reasoning. But whether an epistemic logic
is used or not, the underlying concepts are clearly epistemic. In particular, the notion of
truth at all possible worlds reappears in many different guises throughout the literature.
Research in security analysis has reached a sort of convergence point around the use
of symbolic methods. The challenge seems to be to move beyond this convergence point,
and such a move requires taking resources seriously: realistic definitions of security rely
on the notion that exploiting a vulnerability should require more resources (time, power,
information) than are realistically available to an attacker. In epistemic terms, what is
needed is a reasonably well-behaved definition of resource-bounded knowledge, itself an
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active area of research in epistemic logic. It would appear, then, that advances in epistemic
logic may well help increase our ability to reason about security in direct ways.
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6 Bibliographic Notes and Further Reading
For the basics of epistemic logic, both the syntax and the semantics, the reader is referred
to the introductory chapter of the current volume. For the sake of making this chapter as
self-contained as possible, most of the background material can be usefully obtained from
the textbooks of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi [42] and Meyer and Van der Hoek [88].
The possible-worlds definition of knowledge used throughout this chapter is simply the
view that knowledge is truth at all worlds that an agent considers as possible alternatives
to the current world, a view which goes back to Hintikka [64].
Cryptographic Protocols. While the focus of the section is on symbolic cryptographic
protocol analysis, cryptographic protocols can also be studied from the perspective of
more computationally-driven cryptography, of the kind described in §5; see Goldreich
[49]. The Russian Cards problem, which was first presented at the Moscow Mathematic
Olympiads in 2000, is described formally and studied from an epistemic perspective by
Van Ditmarsch [122]. The problem has been used as a benchmark for several epistemic
logic model checkers [123]. The Dining Cryptographers problem and the corresponding
protocol is described by Chaum [27]. It was proved correct in an epistemic temporal logic
model checker by Van der Meyden and Su [121].
For a good overview of classical cryptography along with some perspectives on proto-
cols, see Stinson [110] and Schneier [107]; both volumes contain descriptions of DES, AES,
RSA, and elliptic-curve cryptography. Goldreich [48, 49] is also introductory, but from the
perspective of modern computational cryptography.
For a good high-level survey of the kind of problems surrounding the design and de-
ployment of cryptographic protocols, see Anderson and Needham [8], then follow upwith
Abadi and Needham’s [5] prudent engineering practices. The key distribution protocol
used as the first example in §2.2 is related to the Yahalom protocol described by Burrows,
Abadi, and Needham [23]. The Needham-Schroeder protocol was first described in Need-
ham and Schroeder [94]. The man-in-the-middle attack on the Needham-Schroeder pro-
tocol in the presence of an insider attacker was pointed out by Lowe [77], and the fix was
analyzed by Lowe [78].
The Dolev-Yao model of the attacker given in §2.3 is due to Dolev and Yao [38].
The formal definition of message knowledge via Analyzed and Synthesized sets is taken
from Paulson [98]. Equivalent definitions are given in nearly every formal system for rea-
soning about cryptographic protocols in a formal model of cryptography. Message knowl-
edge can be defined using a local deductive system, which makes it fit nicely within the
deductive knowledge framework of Konolige [71]—see also Pucella [99]. More generally,
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message knowledge is a form of algorithmic knowledge [56], that is, a local form of knowl-
edge that relies on an algorithm to compute what an agent knows based on the local state
of the agent. In the case of a Dolev-Yao attacker, this local algorithm simply computes the
sets of analyzed and synthesized messages [61].
Another way of defining message knowledge is the hidden automorphismmodel, due
toMerritt [87], which is a form of possible-worlds knowledge. While it never gained much
traction, it has been used in later work by Toussaint and Wolper [119] and also in the logic
of Bieber [20]. It uses algebraic presentations of encryption schemes called cryptoalgebras.
There is a unique surjective cryptoalgebra homomorphism from the free cryptoalgebra
over a set of plaintexts and keys to any cryptoalgebra over the same plaintexts and keys
which acts as the identity on plaintexts and keys. Message knowledge in a given cryptoal-
gebra C is knowledge of the structure of messages as given by that surjective homomor-
phism from the free cryptoalgebra to C . A revealed reduct is a subset of C that the agent
has seen. A state of knowledge with respect to revealed reduct R is a set of of mappings f
from the free cryptoalgebra to C that are homomorphisms on f−1(R). In this context, an
agent knowsmessagem if the agent knows the representation of messagem, meaning that
m is the image of the same free cryptoalgebra term under every mapping in the state of
knowledge of the agent. Thus, if an agent receives {m1}k and {m2}k but does not receive
k, then only {m1}k and {m2}k are in the revealed reduct; the agent may consider any dis-
tinct messages m′1 and m
′
2 to map to {m1}k and {m2}k after encryption with k, since any
such mapping will act as a homomorphism on the pre-image of the revealed reduct.
Possible-worlds definitions of knowledge in the presence of cryptography are problem-
atic because cryptography affects what agents can observe, and this impacts the definition
of the accessibility relation between worlds. The idea of replacing encrypted messages in
the local state of agents by a token goes back to Abadi and Tuttle’s semantics for BAN
Logic [7]. Treating encrypted messages as tokens while still allowing agents to distinguish
different encrypted messages is less common, but has been used at least by Askarov and
Sabelfeld [10] and Askarov, Hedin, and Sabelfeld [9] in the context of information flow.
There are several frameworks for formally reasoning about cryptographic protocols,
and I shall not list them all here. But I hope to provide enough pointers to the literature to
ensure that the important ones are covered. For an early survey on the state of the art in
formal reasoning about cryptographic protocols until 1995, see Meadows [85].
The Inductive Method described in §2.5 is due to Paulson [98], and is built atop the
Isabelle logical framework [97], a framework for higher-order logic. BAN Logic is intro-
duced by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham [23], who use it to perform an analysis of several
existing protocols in the literature. The logic courted controversy pretty much right from
the start [95, 24]. Probably the most talked-about problem with BAN Logic is the lack of
an independently-motivated semantics which would ensure that statements of the logic
match operational intuition. Without such a semantics, it is difficult to argue for the rea-
sonableness of the result of a BAN Logic analysis, except for the pragmatic observation
that failure to prove a statement in BAN Logic often indicates a problem with the cryp-
tographic protocol. Abadi and Tuttle [7] attempt to remedy the situation by defining a
semantics for BAN Logic. Successor logics extending or modifying BAN Logic generally
start with a variant of the Abadi-Tuttle semantics [113, 51, 125, 116, 126, 111]. Contempo-
rary epistemic logic alternatives to BAN Logic were also developed, using a semantics in
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terms of protocol execution, but they never really took hold [20, 92].
The model checker MCK is described by Gammie and Van der Meyden [43], and was
used to analyze the Dining Cryptographers protocol [121] as well as the Seven Hands pro-
tocol for the Russian Cards problem [123]. TDL is an alternative epistemic temporal logic
for reasoning about cryptographic protocols with a model checker developed by Penczek
and Lomuscio [76], based on a earlier model checker [100]. TDL is a branching-time tempo-
ral epistemic logic extended with a message knowledge primitive in addition to standard
possible-worlds knowledge for expressing higher-order knowledge, and does not provide
explicit support for attackers in its modeling language. The model-checking complexity
results mentioned are due to Van der Meyden and Shilov [120]; see also Engelhardt, Gam-
mie, and Van der Meyden [40] and Huang and Van der Meyden [68].
Another epistemic logic which forms the basis for reasoning about cryptographic pro-
tocol is Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) [45]. DEL is an epistemic logic of broadcast an-
nouncements which includes formulas of the form [ρ]iϕ, read ϕ holds after agent i broadcasts
formula ρ, where ρ is a formula in a propositional epistemic sublanguage. (The actual syn-
tax of DEL is slightly different.) Agents may broadcast that they know a fact, and this
broadcast affects the knowledge of other agents. Kripke structures are used to capture
the state of knowledge of agents at a point in time, and agent i announcing ρ will change
Kripke structureM representing the current state of knowledge of all agents into a Kripke
structureMρ,i representing the new state of knowledge that obtains. Dynamic Epistemic
Logic has been used to analyze the Seven Hands protocol in great detail [122]. Extensions
to handle cryptography are described by Hommersom, Meyer, and De Vink [66], as well
as Van Eijck and Orzan [124].
Process calculi, starting with the spi calculus [4] and later the applied pi calculus [3],
have been particularly successful tools for reasoning about cryptographic protocols. These
use either observational equivalence to show that a process implementation of the protocol
is equivalent to another process that clearly satisfies the required properties, or static anal-
ysis such as type checking to check the properties [52]. Epistemic logics defined against
models obtained from processes are given by Chadha, Delaune, and Kremer [26] and Ton-
inho and Caires [118]. Another process calculus, CSP, has also proved popular as a foun-
dation for reasoning about cryptographic protocols [79, 102].
Finally, other approaches rely on logic programming ideas: the NRL protocol analyzer
[86], Multiset Rewriting [25], and ProVerif [21]. Thayer, Herzog, and Guttman [117] intro-
duce a distinct semantic model for protocols, strand spaces, which has some advantages
over traces. Syverson [114] develops an authentication logic on top of strand spaces, while
Halpern and Pucella [59] investigate the suitability of strand spaces as a basis for epistemic
reasoning.
Information Flow. Bell and LaPadula [18, 73] were among the first to develop manda-
tory access control, and introducing the idea of attaching security levels to data to enforce
confidentiality.
Early work on information flow security mostly focused on event traces, and tried to
describe both closure conditions on traces, as well as unwinding conditions that would
allow one to check that a set of event traces satisfies the security condition. Separability
was defined by McLean [84], noninference by O’Halloran [96], generalized noninference
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by McLean [84], and generalized noninterference by McCullough [82, 83] following the
work of Goguen and Meseguer [46, 47]. Other definitions of information-flow security for
event systems are given by Sutherland [112] and Wittbold and Johnson [127]. A modern
approach to information-flow security in event systems is described by Mantel [81]. The
set-theoretic description of the knowledge operator is taken fromHalpern [54], but appears
in various guises in the economics literature [11]. Halpern andO’Neill [58] layer an explicit
epistemic language on top of the eventmodels re-expressed as Kripke structures, and show
that the resulting logic can capture common definitions of confidentiality in event systems.
Denning and Denning [36] first pointed out that programming languages are a use-
ful setting for reasoning about information flow by observing that static analysis can be
used to identify and control information flow. Most recent work on information-flow se-
curity from a programming language perspective goes back toHeintze and Riecke’s Secure
Lambda Calculus [63] in a functional language setting, and Smith and Volpano [109] in an
imperative language setting. Honda, Vasconcelos, and Yoshida [67] give a similar devel-
opment in the context of a process calculus. Sabelfeld and Myers [104] give a survey and
overview of the state of the field up to 2003. Balliu, Dam, and Le Guernic [14, 15] offer a
rare use of an explicit epistemic temporal logic to reason about information-flow security.
Sabelfeld and Sands [105] give a good overview of the issues involved in declassification
for language-based information flow. Askarov and Sabelfeld [10] use an epistemic logic in
the context of declassification. Chong [29] uses a form of algorithmic knowledge to model
information release requirements.
Beyond Confidentiality. Protocols for anonymous communication generally rely on a
cloud of intermediaries that prevent information about the identity of the original sender
to be isolated; Crowds is an example of such a protocol [101]. Anonymity has been well
studied as an instance of confidentiality [69, 44]. The explicit connection with epistemic
logic was made by Halpern and O’Neill [57], which is the source of the definitions in §4.
An early analysis of anonymity via epistemic logic is given by Syverson and Stubblebine
[115].
Anonymity is an important component of voting protocols. Van Eijck and Orzan [124]
prove anonymity for a specific voting protocol using epistemic logic. More general analy-
ses of voting protocols with epistemic logic have also been attempted [16, 72]. The model
of coercion resistance in §4 is from Ku¨sters and Truderung [72].
Zero knowledge interactive proof systemswere introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and
Rackoff [50] and have become an important tool in theoretical computer science. A good
overview is given by Goldreich [48]. Halpern, Moses, and Tuttle [55] give an epistemically-
motivated analysis of zero knowledge interactive proof systems using a computationally-
bounded definition of knowledge devised by Moses [93].
Another context in which epistemic concepts—or perhaps more accurately, epistemic
vocabulary—appear is that of authorization and trust management. Credential-based au-
thorization policies can be used to control access to resources by requiring agents to present
appropriate credentials (such as certificates) proving that they are allowed access. Because
systems that rely on credential-based authorization policies are often decentralized sys-
tems, meaning that there is no central clearinghouse for determining for every authoriza-
tion request whether an agent has the appropriate credentials, the entire approach relies
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on a web of trust between agents and credentials. Since in many such systems credentials
can be delegated—an agent may allow another agent to act on her behalf—not only can
credential checking become complicated, but authorization policies themselves become
nontrivial to analyze to determine contradictions (an action being both allowed and for-
bidden by the policy under certain conditions) or coverage (a class of actions remaining
unregulated by the policy under certain conditions). Where do epistemic concepts come
up in such a scenario? Authorization logics from the one introduced by Abadi, Burrows,
Lampson, and Plotkin [1] to the recent NAL [106] have been described as logics of belief,
and are somewhat reminiscent of BAN Logic. One of their basic primitives is a formula
A says F , which as a credential means that A believes and is accountable for the truth of F .
Delegation, for example, is captured by a formula (A says F ) ⇒ (B says G). This form of
belief is entirely axiomatic, just like belief in BAN Logic.
Perspectives. Ryan and Schneider [103] have extended the Dolev-Yao model of attackers
with an XOR operation; Millen and Shmatikov [90] with products and enough exponentia-
tion to model the Diffie-Hellman key-establishment protocol [37]; and Lowe [80] and later
Corin, Doumen, and Etalle [32] and Baudet [17] with the ability tomount offline dictionary
attacks. As described by Halpern and Pucella [61], many of these can be expressed using
algorithmic knowledge, at least in the context of eavesdropping attackers. More generally,
extending Dolev-Yao with additional operations can best be studied using equational the-
ories, that is, equations induced by looking at the algebra of the additional operations; see
for example Abadi and Cortier [2] and Chevalier and Rusinowitch [28].
While it would be distracting to discuss the back and forth over BAN Logic in the
decades since its inception, I will point out that recent work by Cohen and Dam has taken
a serious look at the logic with modern eyes, and highlighted both interesting interpreta-
tions as well as subtleties [31, 30]. The protocol composition logic PCL of Datta, Derek,
Mitchell, and Roy [33], which builds on earlier work by Durgin, Mitchell, and Pavlovic
[39], is a modern attempt at devising a logic for Hoare-style reasoning about cryptographic
protocols.
A good overview of concrete models of cryptography is given by Goldreich [48]. Se-
mantic security, among others, is studied by Bellare, Chor, Goldreich, and Schnorr [19].
The relationship between formal models of cryptography and concrete models—howwell
does the former approximate the latter?—has been explored by Abadi and Rogaway [6],
and later extended by Micciancio and Warinschi [89], among others. Backes, Hofheinz,
and Unruh [12] provide a good overview.
Approaches to analyze cryptographic protocols in a concrete model of cryptography
have been developed [75, 91]. In recent years some of the approaches for analyzing cryp-
tographic protocols in a formal model of cryptography have been modified to work with a
concrete model of cryptography, such as PCL [34] and ProVerif [22]. In some cases, crypto-
graphic protocol analysis in a concrete model relies on extending indistinguishability over
states to indistinguishability over the whole protocol [35].
Defining a notion of resource-bounded knowledge that does not suffer from the logical
omniscience problem is an ongoing research project in the epistemic logic community, and
various approaches have been advocated, each with its advantages and its deficiencies: al-
gorithmic knowledge [56], impossible possible worlds [65], awareness [41]. A comparison
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between the approaches in terms of expressiveness and pragmatics appears in Halpern
and Pucella [60].
Information flow in probabilistic programs was first investigated by Gray and Syver-
son [53] using probabilistic multiagent systems [62]. Backes and Pfitzmann [13] study it
in a more computational setting. Smith [108] presents some of the tools that need to be
considered to analyze the kind of partial information leakage occurring in the password-
checking example. Preliminary work on information flow in the presence of cryptography
includes Laud [74], Hutter and Schairer [70], and Askarov, Hedin, and Sabelfeld [9].
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